Local police suspected Billy Greenwood was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags Greenwood had left at the curb for pickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges.
Voting 6 to 2, the Court held that garbage placed at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court argued that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on public streets “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.” The Court also noted that the police cannot be expected to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by “any member of the public.”
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The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. But individuals “subject to a warrantless, suspicionless search condition have ‘severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone.’ ” United States v. Cervantes , 859 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Samson v. California , 547 U.S. 843, 852, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006) ). Here, a condition of Dixon’s supervised release mandated that he “submit to a search of his person, residence, office, vehicle, or any property under his control … at any time with or without suspicion.”
But this authority is not limitless, and we have explained that to conduct a search of property pursuant to this condition, the individual subject to it must “exhibit[ ] a sufficiently strong connection to [the property in question] to demonstrate ‘control’ over it.” Korte , 918 F.3d at 754 (quoting Grandberry , 730 F.3d at 980 ). In other words, before the police could search Dixon’s blue Honda minivan without a warrant or probable cause, they had to have a sufficient basis to believe he owned or controlled that vehicle. In this case, the police crossed that knowledge threshold only when they inserted the key that Dixon had dropped into the car lock, thereby confirming that he exercised control over the minivan.
Therefore, we must determine whether inserting that key into the minivan’s lock was itself permissible under the Fourth Amendment. This matters because if inserting the key into the car lock violated Dixon’s Fourth Amendment rights, the officers’ resulting knowledge and authority to search that vehicle would be tainted by a Fourth Amendment violation. Given that the district court had already ruled that the officers’ search of Dixon’s apartment violated the Fourth Amendment, the officers would have lacked justification for Dixon’s arrest and subsequent stationhouse search. Thus, the trial court would have had to suppress the drugs found on Dixon’s person, and the government would have been left with no admissible drug evidence at Dixon’s trial.
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When Officer Ochoa inserted the key into the minivan’s lock, an “effect,” he physically intruded onto a constitutionally protected area. This physical intrusion was done for the express purpose of obtaining information, specifically to learn whether Dixon exercised control over the minivan. Thus, the insertion of the key into the minivan’s lock constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
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The Government obtained the civil forfeiture of a 1986 Dodge Ram Charger and $277,000 in U.S. currency found in this vehicle, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). Claimant Montes appeals on the ground that evidence discovered in the search of the Dodge Ram Charger should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He contends that the police conduct in searching the leased Dodge Ram Charger, which was covered and parked in the backyard of a home, in order to discover the vehicle identification number (“VIN”), was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The $277,000 in currency was discovered in the process and was confiscated when the narcotics-detector dog alerted on the currency. The central issue of the appeal is whether the police have a right to search a parked vehicle to obtain the VIN. Execution of the judgment has been stayed pending this appeal, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 62(d).
“Removal of the cover of the vehicle having been a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the evidence, which is the product of that search, must be excluded at trial. ”
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“The Fourth Amendment is a vital safeguard of the right of the citizen to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions into any area in which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (citations omitted). As the parties agree, Monghur, at least initially, held a reasonable expectation of privacy in the closed container that he stored in the closet in Wilson’s apartment. See United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003) (“`A person has an expectation of privacy in his or her private, closed containers’ and `does not forfeit that expectation of privacy merely because the container is located in a place that is not controlled exclusively by the container’s owner.'” (quoting United States v. Fultz, 146 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 1998))). The only question raised by this appeal is whether Monghur relinquished, abandoned, or otherwise waived that expectation of privacy by disclosing the handgun’s existence and location in jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law enforcement.
When made to a law enforcement officer, an unequivocal, contemporaneous, and voluntary disclosure that a package or container contains contraband waives any reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (recognizing that “reasonableness” remains the touchstone under the Fourth Amendment).
Nothing about his jailhouse conversations with Bousley, which law enforcement later overheard, operates as a “direct and explicit” waiver of an expectation of privacy in a container hidden elsewhere. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d at 1156. Monghur’s efforts to conceal the subject matter based on what he said on the phone demonstrate both an objective and subjective intention to preserve privacy — not to relinquish it. We therefore reject the Government’s position that Monghur waived his expectation of privacy in the closed container through his statements on the telephone.
To be clear, we think based on his admissions in the jail telephone conversations, coupled with Monghur’s criminal record for violence and what officers discovered when Wilson invited them to look around, Agent McCamey had probable cause to believe Monghur had a firearm stashed inside Wilson’s apartment. Exigency was not established here and is unchallenged on appeal. Therefore, we must presume that, after discovering Monghur’s possessions in the closet and identifying the green plastic container (i.e., what they reasonably believed was “the green”), agents could have sealed the apartment and presented their observations from the investigation, Monghur’s known criminal history, and Monghur’s conversations with Bousley to a neutral and detached magistrate to support a warrant application. But, we find no basis to conclude that Monghur waived his expectation of privacy in the closed container because he made an encrypted, incriminating disclosure that he was warned would be reviewed by law enforcement. Accordingly, the agents’ search of his closed container without a warrant violated Monghur’s Fourth Amendment rights.
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The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whether a search is reasonable will depend upon its nature and all of the circumstances surrounding it, United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985), but, as a general matter, warrantless searches are unreasonable. See Cody v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).
Searches conducted at the nation’s borders, however, represent a well-established and long-standing exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977); see also United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004). The exception applies not only at the physical boundaries of the United States, but also at the “the functional equivalent” of a border, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), including the first port where a ship docks after arriving from a foreign country, United States v. Smith, 273 F.3d 629, 633 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2001). The search here, conducted as the Adventure of the Seas arrived in St. Thomas from St. Maarten, was therefore a border search.
In the case most clearly on point, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the search of private living quarters on a ship should require something more than naked suspicion.” United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 738 (9th Cir. 1985).
As a passenger of a cruise liner, Whitted had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cabin: he excluded others from it, used it as his home, and slept and conducted his daily life therein.
Mindful of the “centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home,” we, therefore, consider a search of a individual’s living quarters among the most intrusive of searches — invading as it does a place where the individual expects not to be disturbed. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999); see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006); United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mick, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”). Here, the search was highly intrusive on the defendant’s privacy. Uninvited and in Whitted’s absence, the officers entered his de facto home, searched through his belongings, and subjected his private space to inspection by a drug-sniffing dog.
Because of the high expectation of privacy and level of intrusiveness, the search cannot be considered “routine” and must therefore be supported by reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.
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Sandoval’s expectation of privacy was also objectively reasonable. In LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1326 n. 11, 1332 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1985), we held that a person can have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent on private property. In Gooch, 6 F.3d at 677, we extended that holding to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent on a public campground. Here, the tent was located on BLM land, not on a public campground, and it is unclear whether Sandoval had permission to be there. However, we do not believe the reasonableness of Sandoval’s expectation of privacy turns on whether he had permission to camp on public land. Such a distinction would mean that a camper who overstayed his permit in a public campground would lose his Fourth Amendment rights, while his neighbor, whose permit had not expired, would retain those rights.
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Gooch must have had both a subjective and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the tent. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).
SEARCH: We have already established that a person can have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent on private property. LaDuke v. Nelson,762 F.2d 1318, 1326 n. 11, 1332 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1985). Accord LaDuke v. Castillo,455 F. Supp. 209 (E.D.Wash. 1978). This reasonable expectation is not destroyed when a person’s tent is pitched instead on a public campground where one is legally permitted to camp. The Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.” Katz,389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at 511; id. at 351-52, 88 S.Ct. at 511
ARREST: No warrant is required to arrest a suspected felon in a public place. United States v. Watson,423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). Absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless arrest is unconstitutional in a “non-public” place, even when that place is not one’s residence. United States v. Alvarez,810 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1987); Minnesota v. Olson,495 U.S. 91, 96 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1688 n. 5, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). See United States v. Ruckman,806 F.2d 1471, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., dissenting) (suggesting that inhabitant of cave on public property has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy therein even if the cave is not considered a house).
Though Gooch’s tent was pitched on public property, we hold that the closed tent was a “non-public” place for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. We have recognized that, despite the special status afforded a residence under the Fourth Amendment, “an individual’s privacy interests may be implicated in a variety of other settings.” United States v. Driver,776 F.2d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1985). By establishing a campground, the state created a situation where campers were invited to come to set up a tent. The campers could reasonably assert a legitimate, though temporary, interest in their privacy even in this short-term “dwelling.”
We hold that Gooch’s warrantless arrest in his tent violated the proscription of the Fourth Amendment.
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Nowhere is the protective force of the Fourth Amendment more powerful than it is when the sanctity of the home is involved. The sanctity of a person’s home, perhaps our last real retreat in this technological age, lies at the very core of the rights which animate the amendment. Therefore, we have been adamant in our demand that absent exigent circumstances a warrant will be required before a person’s home is invaded by the authorities.
We can conceive of no reason to distinguish a garage, where people spend time, work, and store their possessions, from a den or a kitchen, where people spend time, work, and store their possessions. Simply put, a person’s garage is as much a part of his castle as the rest of his home.
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The United States appealed from orders of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Donald S. Voorhees, J., granting defendants’ suppression motions. The Court of Appeals, J. Blaine Anderson, Circuit Judge, held that action of airline employee in opening a “Speed Pak” was that of a government agent where only reason he opened case was his suspicion that it contained illegal drugs, employee, who at one time had been a listed informant, expected a probable reward from Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA agent testified that such expectation was reasonable and that although agency had no prior knowledge of the particular search and had not directed employee to perform it, it had encouraged him to engage in such types of search and employee had previously opened Speed Paks with no discouragement from the agency and had been rewarded for providing drug information in the past, although his informant’s file had previously been closed.
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Mr. Luis Alfonso Leon was stopped by law enforcement after he was observed illegally driving in a passing lane. During the traffic stop, the officer began to suspect Mr. Leon was trafficking drugs. A search of his vehicle uncovered seventy-six pounds of methamphetamine, and Mr. Leon was charged with one count of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Following a failed motion to suppress, he pled guilty and was sentenced to seventy months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Mr. Leon challenges the denial of his suppression motion, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and investigate the suspected drug trafficking. We agree and therefore reverse.
Takeaways:
1. the fact that the defendant was coming from Phoenix when he was stopped near Denver did not provide reasonable suspicion for prolonging the traffic stop;
2. The defendant‘s travel plans of driving from Denver to pick up religious books and perhaps stay for an event were not so implausible as to provide reasonable suspicion for prolonging traffic stop;
3. The condition of the vehicle’s interior did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity;
4. The defendant’s alleged nervousness during the traffic stop was not extreme and bore negligible weight in determining whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion for prolonging traffic stop; and
5. The trooper’s belief that the defendant was traveling in a third-party vehicle did not provide reasonable suspicion.
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