Police prolonged a stop by waiting for a K-9 unit to arrive because driver had air freshers.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons … against unreasonable searches and seizures.”U.S. Const.amend. IV. A traffic stop constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996);Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). The reasonableness of a traffic stop depends on whether the police have reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014).

A traffic stop that is constitutionally inbounds at its inception could eventually impinge on the vehicle occupant’s rights in some circumstances. If an officer executes a traffic stop unreasonably, the stop could violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the person seized. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). “A lawful traffic stop must therefore be limited in scope and duration.” United States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th 522, 529 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)). An officer needs reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop beyond what is necessary to resolve the initial reason for the stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354–55.

To continue detaining Taylor after the time that was necessary to complete the traffic citation, Officer Cox needed reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing (other than speeding). Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350.

According to the government, several facts that Officer Cox learned during the indisputably permissible part of the stop gave her reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop to await the K-9 unit. Those facts include: (1) Taylor’s travel plans; (2) Taylor’s criminal history involving firearms and narcotics; (3) multiple air fresheners on Taylor’s gear shift; and (4)Taylor’s odd movements while searching for proof of insurance.

Under the totality of the circumstances and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government, Officer Cox did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop. The reasonable-suspicion indicators are weak and subject to qualification. In fact, the district court recognized that Taylor’s travel plans, criminal history, and air fresheners may not have been enough to establish reasonable suspicion. But it held that his alleged suspicious movements moved the needle enough to justify extending the stop.

We disagree. Because Officer Cox prompted Taylor’s movements and Taylor complied with her requests, that factor holds very little weight. Similarly, Taylor’s travel plans and air fresheners offer little, if anything, to the reasonable-suspicion analysis. Adding his criminal history to the mix is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because it is combined with only these other weak indicators. Ultimately, “this case lacks any of the stronger indicators of criminal conduct” typically necessary to establish reasonable suspicion. See Townsend, 305 F.3d at 545. The threshold for reasonable suspicion may be low, but it is not nonexistent. Thus, we hold that Officer Cox lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified extending Taylor’s stop to conduct a dog sniff.

Read the full case here: United States v. Taylor, No. 23-5344 (6th Cir. 2024), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-5344/23-5344-2024-11-15.html

Rodriquez case: https://youtu.be/S1SqtpTv-c8