May officers, as a matter of standard procedure and in the name of “officer safety,” detain and frisk a driver stopped for an equipment infraction solely on the basis that the stop occurs in a high crime area at night? Here we conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not permit such an intrusion and that any incriminating evidence flowing from the illegal contact, which may include statements made by the driver, is inadmissible.

Roman Medina appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress cocaine found on his person and in his vehicle, as well as statements he made to the police at the time of his detention and search. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) After the court denied his motion, Medina pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. (Health Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) Entry of judgment was deferred, and Medina was placed on probation. He contends that the cocaine and the statements attributed to him were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. We agree and, accordingly, reverse.

We reject the People’s claim that the search was prompted by Medina’s admission. Officer Lopez testified that he set out to conduct a patdown pursuant to his “standard procedure,” and his act of securing Medina’s hands behind his head was part and parcel of that search. We also agree with Medina that his detention was rendered unlawful when Officer Lopez grabbed his hands, and that the ensuing search was also illegal because the officer failed to offer articulable facts demonstrating a reasonable suspicion that Medina was armed and dangerous. Indeed, the officer admitted there were no such facts. The only reason for restraining Medina’s hands and searching him was the time and location of the stop. Apparently, anyone observed to be driving in that area at night with a citable equipment defect would be stopped and subjected to a patdown search. The Fourth Amendment plainly prohibits the police from employing such a procedure.

Read the full case here: People v. Medina, 110 Cal.App.4th 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), https://casetext.com/case/people-v-medina-299

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Most of us nowadays carry a cell phone. And our phones frequently contain information chronicling our daily lives—where we go, whom we see, what we say to our friends, and the like. When a person is suspected of a crime, his phone thus can serve as a fruitful source of evidence, especially if he committed the offense in concert with others with whom he might communicate about it. Does this mean that, whenever officers have reason to suspect a person of involvement in a crime, they have probable cause to search his home for cell phones because he might own one and it might contain relevant evidence? That, in essence, is the central issue raised by this case.

Appellant Ezra Griffith was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that police discovered it while executing an invalid warrant to search his home. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Griffith at trial. Griffith now challenges the denial of his motion to suppress.

The warrant authorized officers to search for and seize all cell phones and other electronic devices in Griffith’s residence. The supporting affidavit, however, offered almost no reason to suspect that Griffith in fact owned a cell phone, or that any phone or other device containing incriminating information would be found in his apartment. In our view, the fact that most people now carry a cell phone was not enough to justify an intrusive search of a place lying at the center of the Fourth Amendment’s protections—a home—for any phone Griffith might own.

We therefore agree with Griffith that the warrant to search his residence was unsupported by probable cause. We also reject the government’s arguments that, even if the warrant was invalid, the firearm still need not have been excluded from the evidence against him. Consequently, we vacate Griffith’s conviction.

Read the full case here: United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, (D.C. Cir. 2017), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-griffith-33

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The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a “seizure” of “persons” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007) (holding that passengers as well as the driver are seized during a traffic stop). Therefore it must be reasonable. At its inception, a traffic stop is reasonable if there was probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred, regardless of the officer’s subjective motivation for making the stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 813 (1996). However, a lawfully initiated traffic stop can become unreasonable if it exceeds the scope or duration necessary to address the traffic infraction. United States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th 522, 529 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)). “If an officer exceeds the scope or duration of a traffic stop, he must have ‘reasonable suspicion’ [of criminal activity] to continue the stop on unrelated grounds.” Id. (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354-55).

The Supreme Court explained the lawful parameters of a traffic stop in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015). “A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez, 575 at 350-51 (cleaned up). The mission of issuing a ticket includes incidental inquiries such as “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at 355. Once “the tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed,” the officer no longer has authority to continue the detention. Id. at 354.

Here, Officer Greene initially pursued the mission of the traffic stop. After executing the stop, he told Williams about the inoperable brake light, checked Williams’ proof of insurance, and obtained Williams’ license and registration. Officer Greene then returned to his cruiser and verified Williams’ information. All of these actions are routine inquiries incident to a traffic stop.

Then, Officer Greene deviated from his mission. After verifying Williams’ license and registration, Officer Greene possessed all the information he needed to conclude the traffic stop. However, he did not issue a ticket or a warning for the brake light. Nor did he return Williams’ license and registration. Instead, he directed Williams to exit the vehicle and, out of the hearing of Defendant, posed a series of questions regarding where Defendant had travelled on Boone Street. Officer Greene then observed that Boone Street was a high narcotics area and asked Williams if he had narcotics in the vehicle. When Williams denied this, Officer Greene requested consent to search just to “make sure” there were no drugs. During this time period-from Officer Greene’s request for Williams to exit the vehicle to Williams’ consent to search-Officer Greene took no action in furtherance of the traffic stop, which he had at that point abandoned. Instead, as Officer Greene acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing, his questioning of Williams was aimed at uncovering information about narcotics.

“The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Greene’s questioning of Williams was relatively brief. But given Rodriguez’s bright line rule against suspicionless extensions of a traffic stop, a two-minute extension, such as occurred here, is constitutionally significant.” United States v. Malone, 2:23-CR-00120-11-JRG-CRW, 10 (E.D. Tenn. Sep. 13, 2024)

READ THE FULL CASE HERE: United States v. Malone, 2:23-CR-00120-11-JRG-CRW, 6-7 (E.D. Tenn. Sep. 13, 2024), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-malone-173/

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The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. When determining whether someone’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, “the ultimate touchstone . . . is ‘reasonableness.’ ” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)
(citations omitted). Even an initial seizure based on probable cause “can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (citation omitted). “[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015). Specifically, whether a seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police officer’s investigation of that violation, and the duration of an officer’s inquiries “is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’– to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related
safety concerns.” Id. at 354 (citations omitted).

The government’s attempt to characterize the situation as an evolving one misses the mark. To the extent the situation did evolve, it was due to Sergeant Currie unlawfully prolonging what should have been a brief detention so that deputies could impound the vehicle. Otherwise, law
enforcement would be free to extend any detention long enough for probable cause to materialize for some offense, even if wholly unrelated to the offense justifying the initial intrusion.

This incident illustrates the danger in permitting law enforcement to take that approach. After the initial detention and pat down, Sergeant Currie availed himself of every opportunity to manufacture some reason to illegally prolong Davis’s detention. After the initial pat down, even though Davis was not the one approaching the Nissan’s driver side door, Sergeant Currie accused Davis of drinking.

Then, Sergeant Currie accused Davis of having dope on him after Davis
complied with his command to close his eyes. He then, for the first time, expressed that Davis was being “talkative” and “animated.” And once Davis asked for his lawyer and invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, Sergeant Currie used that as a basis to arrest Davis, claiming that his refusal to answer drug-related
questions interfered with an investigation into unlawful drug use – something wholly unrelated to the impound warrant about which Sergeant Currie had not asked Davis a single question.

These actions by Sergeant Currie unreasonably prolonged Davis’s detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350 (“[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.”). The unlawful arrest, and the search incident to arrest, which led to the discovery of the gun, suspected cocaine, and toot straw thus “followed directly in an unbroken causal chain of events from that constitutional violation. As a result, the seized [evidence] is the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ ” and is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. See Gorman, 859 F.3d at 714. The Court now turns to whether the government may nonetheless rely on the unlawfully obtained evidence under any exception to the exclusionary rule.

Read the full case here: US V. ROBERT DAVIS, 2024 wl 4795713 (NOV. 14, 2024), https://lawstache.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/US-v.-Davis-23cr-231-Order-Granting-Second-Motion-to-Suppress.pdf

US v. Davis, 23cr-231, Order Granting Second Motion to Suppress

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
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The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons … against unreasonable searches and seizures.”U.S. Const.amend. IV. A traffic stop constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996);Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). The reasonableness of a traffic stop depends on whether the police have reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014).

A traffic stop that is constitutionally inbounds at its inception could eventually impinge on the vehicle occupant’s rights in some circumstances. If an officer executes a traffic stop unreasonably, the stop could violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the person seized. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). “A lawful traffic stop must therefore be limited in scope and duration.” United States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th 522, 529 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)). An officer needs reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop beyond what is necessary to resolve the initial reason for the stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354–55.

To continue detaining Taylor after the time that was necessary to complete the traffic citation, Officer Cox needed reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing (other than speeding). Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350.

According to the government, several facts that Officer Cox learned during the indisputably permissible part of the stop gave her reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop to await the K-9 unit. Those facts include: (1) Taylor’s travel plans; (2) Taylor’s criminal history involving firearms and narcotics; (3) multiple air fresheners on Taylor’s gear shift; and (4)Taylor’s odd movements while searching for proof of insurance.

Under the totality of the circumstances and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government, Officer Cox did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop. The reasonable-suspicion indicators are weak and subject to qualification. In fact, the district court recognized that Taylor’s travel plans, criminal history, and air fresheners may not have been enough to establish reasonable suspicion. But it held that his alleged suspicious movements moved the needle enough to justify extending the stop.

We disagree. Because Officer Cox prompted Taylor’s movements and Taylor complied with her requests, that factor holds very little weight. Similarly, Taylor’s travel plans and air fresheners offer little, if anything, to the reasonable-suspicion analysis. Adding his criminal history to the mix is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because it is combined with only these other weak indicators. Ultimately, “this case lacks any of the stronger indicators of criminal conduct” typically necessary to establish reasonable suspicion. See Townsend, 305 F.3d at 545. The threshold for reasonable suspicion may be low, but it is not nonexistent. Thus, we hold that Officer Cox lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified extending Taylor’s stop to conduct a dog sniff.

Read the full case here: United States v. Taylor, No. 23-5344 (6th Cir. 2024), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-5344/23-5344-2024-11-15.html

Rodriquez case: https://youtu.be/S1SqtpTv-c8

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
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Following denial of his suppression motion, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana for sale. Defendant had approached the Needles, California plant quarantine inspection station in a vehicle bearing Michigan license plates. The quarantine officer, feeling that a more detailed inspection was necessary, identified himself and requested to look into defendant’s vehicle trunk. Defendant opened the trunk for the officer’s inspection. Inside were 200 to 300 pounds of marijuana wrapped in plastic. The officer reached in and took a pinch of the substance to inspect it. He discussed the substance with defendant and they agreed that it appeared to be compost, although the officer in fact suspected that it was marijuana. The officer gave defendant a clearance slip and defendant drove away. The officer then contacted the California Highway Patrol, showed them a sample of the substance, which had fallen to the ground during the inspection of the trunk, and the Highway Patrol thereafter apprehended defendant. (Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. VCR 517, Joseph A. Katz, Judge.)

The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding the quarantine officers may stop motorists at inspection stations and request to look into the trunks of their vehicles without a warrant or probable cause, and that if the motorist voluntarily opens the trunk, the quarantine officer may look therein and remove any plant materials in plain view for further inspection. The court rejected defendant’s suggestion that a sign should be placed at inspection stations or quarantine officers should advise motorists that they may refuse to give their consent to any search. (Opinion by Gardner, P. J., with McDaniel and Morris, JJ., concurring.)

Read full case here: People v. Dickinson, 104 Cal. App. 3d 505, 163 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Ct. App. 1980), https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/104/505.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Border_Protection_Stations

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
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Police stopped Robert Lidster at a checkpoint set up to find information about a recent hit-and-run accident. Lidster was arrested, and later convicted, for drunk driving. Lidster successfully appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court. It relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) holding that a checkpoint is unconstitutional if its only purpose is to uncover “ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.

Does Indianapolis v. Edmond, which dealt with the Fourth and 14th Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures, prohibit checkpoints organized to question motorists about a previous offense and arrest motorists for drunk driving?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held 6-3 that the Illinois checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and was constitutional. It ruled that the checkpoint was reasonable because it advanced a “grave” public interest – “investigating a crime that had resulted in a human death” – and interfered minimally with Fourth Amendment liberty. The Court distinguished Illinois’s “information-seeking” checkpoint from the “crime control” checkpoint struck down in Edmond. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg – while agreeing that Edmond does not invalidate the Illinois checkpoint – dissented from the majority’s decision granting constitutional approval to the checkpoint. They argued that the case should have been remanded to the Illinois courts.

Read the full case here: Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/540/419/#tab-opinion-1961418

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
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Upon this evidence, and knowing that the box was at the airport in the possession of DEA agents, the magistrate issued a warrant for a search of Hendrick’s residence at N. Sidney. Although the warrant states that “on the premises known as 2835 N. Sidney . . . there is now being concealed . . . a . . . cardboard box [containing cocaine],” (emphasis added) it further states “this search warrant is to be executed only upon the condition that the above described box is brought to the aforesaid premises” (emphasis added).

In making the determination as to probable cause, our role is limited to “ensuring that the magistrate had a `substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)). The Supreme Court has stressed that “courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits in which warrants are issued,” Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, see Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3422-23. The condition inserted into the warrant by the magistrate, that the warrant was not to be executed until the suitcase arrived at the house, is the principal source of our concern in this case.

If the suitcase had been in the house, or if probable cause existed to believe it was there, issuance of the warrant would have been proper. However, at the time the warrant was issued, the magistrate knew the suitcase was in the possession of the agents, not at the house. The agents, by calling Hendricks to come for the suitcase tried to ensure that the condition subsequent inserted into the warrant would happen. However, at the time the warrant issued and, in fact, until the suitcase was actually brought to the house, there was no certainty that it would ever be brought there.

Read the full case here: United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1984), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-hendricks-2

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
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