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The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed searches of homes of suspected drug dealers even where there is no direct evidence linking the homes to illegal activity, because the presence of evidence in a drug dealer’s home is a reasonable inference to draw. See, e.g., United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379, 1381–82 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Angulo–Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir.1985). The government argues that this caselaw can and should be extended to drug users, especially since Inspector Lau stated in his affidavit that it is “common” for drug users to have additional drugs and paraphernalia at their residences.

Such an affidavit is available in every case. In effect, the government is looking for a bright-line rule that the police have probable cause to search the house of any person found with any amount of illegal drugs anywhere. This would be a significant extension of the case law, taking it beyond the bounds of what is permitted by the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit has held that “probable cause that a resident of the location has committed a crime is in itself insufficient to satisfy” the requirement that evidence probably will be found at the locations to be searched. See United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1254 (9th Cir.2004); United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1995). Drug dealing and drug using are categorically different crimes. To extend the exception in Fannin and Angulo–Lopez is to eviscerate the rule stated in Fernandez and Gil. See United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.1970) (explaining that if mere probable cause to arrest a suspect also established probable cause to search the suspect’s home, there would be no reason to distinguish search warrants from arrest warrants). The search warrant in this case was facially invalid.

Read the full case here: United States v. Garcia, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2011), https://casetext.com/case/us-v-garcia-335

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During the evening hours of January 5, 2019, officers were dispatched to Dane Arredondo’s (“Dane”) house on a neighbor’s report of a woman screaming and crying inside the residence. When the officers arrived, they entered the home without consent to check on the woman. They found her downstairs, extremely intoxicated but apparently unharmed. While inside the house questioning Dane’s brother, David Arredondo (“David”), about the disturbance, the officers discovered small glass medicine vials. Dane was charged with (1) health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347 ; (2) acquiring controlled substances by fraud, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3) ; and (3) possession of controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844. The government appeals the district court’s order granting Dane’s motion to suppress the vials.

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of persons to be free from unreasonable seizures of their papers and effects. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. A warrantless seizure of property is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement. Robbins v. City of Des Moines, 984 F.3d 673, 680 (8th Cir. 2021). The government contends exigent circumstances and the community caretaker function justified the officers’ presence upstairs and a warrantless seizure of the vials was permissible under the plain view exception.

While we have reservations about the government’s claim that the officers were lawfully present upstairs, the exigent circumstances and community caretaker function having dissipated and the issue of consent being questionable, it is unnecessary to resolve this issue because the plain view exception does not apply. The plain view exception authorizes an officer to seize an object without a warrant if (1) the officer lawfully arrived at the location from which he or she views the object, (2) the object’s “incriminating character” is “immediately apparent,” and (3) “the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.” United States v. Lewis, 864 F.3d 937, 943 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Here, even assuming the first and third prongs are satisfied, the second prong is not because the record does not establish the “incriminating character” of the vials was “immediately apparent.”

For an item’s “incriminating character” to be “immediately apparent,” the officer must have probable cause to associate it with criminal activity. Id. at 944. Deputy Fenton possessed no such probable cause. When he came upon small glass containers that looked similar to containers that hold common household items, such as contact lenses, essential oils, or medications for insulin or fertility, there was no basis to immediately suspect contraband.

Read full case here: United States v. Arredondo, 996 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2021), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-arredondo-47

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On September 24, 2019, shortly after witnessing Manley Johnson leave Appellant Maurice Bailey’s home, Kannapolis, North Carolina police officer Jeremy Page discovered 0.1 grams of cocaine base during a search of Johnson’s vehicle. Officer Page then confronted Bailey about the cocaine sale and instructed him to turn over any drugs still in his possession. In return, Officer Page assured Bailey that he was “going to take it and ․ leave,” and everything would still be “squared away.” J.A. 112. As he later testified, Officer Page expected that Bailey would assist him in future investigations. Prompted by Officer Page’s offer, Bailey handed over 0.7 grams of cocaine base.

In the following weeks, Bailey helped Officer Page locate and arrest an individual for whom the police had an outstanding warrant but did not otherwise aid in Officer Page’s investigations. Then, on November 7, 2019, Officer Page obtained two warrants for Bailey’s arrest: one for the 0.1 grams Bailey sold to Johnson on September 24, and one for the 0.7 grams Bailey turned over that same day. In the process of executing those warrants, Kannapolis police discovered 17.8 grams of cocaine base on Bailey’s person, which led to Bailey’s prosecution for possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

Bailey unsuccessfully moved to suppress the 17.8 grams of cocaine and was convicted of the charge. On appeal, Bailey argues that the district court should have granted his suppression motion because his arrest constituted a breach of Officer Page’s September 24 promise that all would be “squared away.” Because the district court failed to make the factual findings necessary to resolve this argument, we vacate its decision denying Bailey’s motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

____________________
In all such contexts, therefore, where an individual fulfills his obligations under the agreement, “settled notions of fundamental fairness” may require the government “to uphold its end of the bargain,” too. Carrillo, 709 F.2d at 37. To hold otherwise would rubberstamp a police practice that stands to undermine “the honor of the government” and “public confidence in the fair administration of justice.” Carter, 454 F.2d at 428.
__________________

Full case here: UNITED STATES v. BAILEY (2023), https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-4th-circuit/114625754.html

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In February 1980, petitioner Doggett was indicted on federal drug charges, but he left the country before the Drug Enforcement Agency could secure his arrest. The DEA knew that he was later imprisoned in Panama, but after requesting that he be expelled back to the United States, never followed up on his status. Once the DEA discovered that he had left Panama for Colombia, it made no further attempt to locate him. Thus, it was unaware that he reentered this country in 1982 and subsequently married, earned a college degree, found steady employment, lived openly under his own name, and stayed within the law. The Marshal’s Service eventually located him during a simple credit check on individuals with outstanding warrants. He was arrested in September 1988, 81/2 years after his indictment. He moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the Government’s failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, but the District Court denied the motion, and he entered a conditional guilty plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The delay between Doggett’s indictment and arrest violated his right to a speedy trial. His claim meets the Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530, criteria for evaluating speedy trial claims. First, the extraordinary 8 1/2-year lag between his indictment and arrest clearly suffices to trigger the speedy trial enquiry. Second, the Government was to blame for the delay. The District Court’s finding that the Government was negligent in pursuing Doggett should be viewed with considerable deference, and neither the Government nor the record provides any reason to reject that finding. Third, Doggett asserted in due course his right to a speedy trial. The courts below found that he did not know of his indictment before his arrest, and, in the factual basis supporting his guilty plea, the Government essentially conceded this point. Finally, the negligent delay between Doggett’s indictment and arrest presumptively prejudiced his ability to prepare an adequate defense. The Government errs in arguing that the Speedy Trial Clause does not significantly protect a defendant’s interest in fair adjudication. United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 320-323; United States v. MacDonald, 456 U. S. 1, 8; United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U. S. 302, 312, distinguished. Nor does Doggett’s failure to cite any specifically demonstrable prejudice doom his claim, since excessive delay can compromise a trial’s reliability in unidentifiable ways. Presumptive prejudice is part of the mix of relevant Barker factors and increases in importance with the length of the delay. Here, the Government’s egregious persistence in failing to prosecute Doggett is sufficient to warrant granting relief. The negligence caused delay six times as long as that generally deemed sufficient to trigger judicial review, and the presumption of prejudice is neither extenuated, as by Doggett’s acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted. Pp.651-658.

Read the full case here: Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/505/647/case.pdf

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The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[W]arrantless searches are typically unreasonable where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing.” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (quotation omitted).

The border search exception is a “longstanding, historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general principle that a warrant be obtained” for a search. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 621. “[T]he border-search exception allows officers to conduct ‘routine inspections and searches of individuals or conveyances seeking to cross . . . borders’ without any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing.” United States v. Aguilar, 973 F.3d 445, 449 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619) (emphasis added). Moreover, even “[s]o-called ‘nonroutine’ searches need only reasonable suspicion, not the higher threshold of probable cause.” United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2018). “For border searches both routine and not, no case has required a warrant.” Id

The border search exception reflects “the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country.” Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616. “The Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border” and has been recognized “since the beginning of our Government.” United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004). “Historically such broad powers have been necessary to prevent smuggling and to prevent prohibited articles from entry.” Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619.

Accordingly, when it comes to manual cell phone searches at the border, our sister circuits have uniformly held that Riley does not require either a warrant or reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Xiang, 67 F.4th 895, 900 (8th Cir. 2023) (“No Circuit has held that the government must obtain a warrant to conduct a routine border search of electronic devices.”); Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2021) (“We . . . agree with the holdings of the Ninth and Eleventh circuits that basic border searches are routine searches and need not be supported by reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2019) (“manual searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion”).

Read the full case here: USA v. Castillo, No. 21-50406 (5th Cir. 2023), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-50406/21-50406-2023-06-19.html

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Border Patrol agents watched a man climb over the Mexico-United States border fence and followed him as he took a taxi to Heriberto Perea-Rey’s home. An agent watched the suspected undocumented alien walk through the gated entrance to the home and knock on the front door. The agent followed him through the front yard, around the side of the house and into the carport. He found the suspect there, standing with Perea-Rey in front of a side door entrance to the home, and detained both men until other agents arrived. Perea-Rey refused to allow the agents to enter his house. Forgetting for a moment that the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires that the government obtain a warrant before it conducts a search or seizure, particularly of persons in their homes, the agents, pointing their guns at the home, ordered everyone outside. The individuals who emerged were later found to be undocumented aliens.

Indicted for harboring the aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324, Perea-Rey moved to suppress evidence of the aliens as the fruit of a warrantless search and seizure. Though the district court found that the agents entered the curtilage of Perea-Rey’s home and that there were no exigent circumstances that might justify the failure to obtain a warrant, the court denied the motion. Perea-Rey entered a conditional guilty plea and filed this appeal. Because the agents physically occupied the curtilage of Perea-Rey’s home without obtaining a warrant, and no exceptions to the warrant requirement otherwise justified the search or seizure, we reverse Perea-Rey’s conviction and remand.
____
Where the government “physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining information,” that is a “`search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). “[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Because the curtilage is part of the home, searches and seizures in the curtilage without a warrant are also presumptively unreasonable. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984).

Although a warrant is not required to observe readily visible items within the curtilage, and “officers [need not] shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares,” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986), a warrant is required to enter the home.

Full case here: US v. Perea-Rey, 680 F. 3d 1179 – Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 2012, https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3328995699668028305&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

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The issue before this court is whether Captain Walsh was justified in making entry into the Defendant’s residence without first obtaining a search warrant. The United States Supreme Court has held that a warrant is not required to enter a person’s home when “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless [entry] is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). “One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Under this “emergency aid” exception, “officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Id. Officers do not need “ironclad proof of a likely serious, life-threatening injury to invoke the emergency aid exception[.]” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

…

It is worth noting that all cases where a court has found that an exigent circumstance existed appear to share two common factors. First, in all of the cases in which courts found exigency, officers observed events obviously occurring within the residence or building. For example, cries for help, screams, loud noises, or an observation of a struggle or fight within the structure by looking through a window. Second, courts have found exigent circumstances exist when officers observed events or evidence leading directly to a structure. For example, a blood trail leading to a closed door.

There was no evidence leading directly into the home, such as a trail of blood, and there were no noises, voices or screams leading officers to believe someone inside may be in immediate distress or in need of protection. Here, nothing at the accident scene caused Captain Walsh to believe that the driver was seriously injured. By the time Captain Walsh arrived at the residence, the Defendant had already managed to walk back to his house and fall asleep in his bedroom upstairs. Captain Walsh did not see or hear anything to cause one to think that someone was in the home, much less that someone was in need of immediate assistance.

Full case here: State v. Gibson, No. M2012-02363-CCA-R3-CD, 12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2013), https://casetext.com/case/state-v-gibson-395

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“To invoke the Fourth Amendment protections, a person must show that [they] had a legitimate expectation of privacy.” U.S. v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). An expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is one that society accepts as objectively reasonable. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 3940 (1988).

“The Fourth Amendment shields not only actual owners, but also anyone with sufficient possessory rights over the property searched.” Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2015). “[A] defendant who lacks an ownership interest may still have standing to challenge a search, upon a showing of ‘joint control’ or ‘common authority’ over the property searched.” United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “Common authority rests ‘on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.’” Id. For example, “a defendant may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in another’s car if the defendant is in possession of the car, has the permission of the owner, holds a key to the car, and has the right and ability to exclude others, except the owner, from the car.” Id. at 1198 (9th Cir. 2006).
…
Rubin does not challenge the validity of the search warrant but rather challenges the continued placement and monitoring of the GPS tracking device as unreasonable after law enforcement became aware that Morgan was no longer driving the white pickup. (ECF No. 26 at 5-6, 10-11.) The issue here is essentially whether the continued GPS tracking was conducted within the scope of the warrant. “If the scope of [a] search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant . . ., the [search and any] subsequent seizure [are] unconstitutional without more.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990). “Whether a search exceeds the scope of a search warrant is an issue [courts] determine through an objective assessment of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant, the contents of the search warrant, and the circumstances of the search.” United States v. Hitchcock, 286 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir.), opinion amended andsuperseded on other grounds, 298 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2002); see, e.g., United States v. Hurd, 499 F.3d 963, 966-69 (9th Cir. 2007) (application of the Hitchcock test)).
…
An objective assessment of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant does not support the conclusion that the issuing judge authorized the GPS tracking of the white pickup while driven exclusively by someone other than Morgan-such as Rubin.

Full case: United States v. Rubin, 3:22-cr-00012-MMD-CSD-1, 5 (D. Nev. Apr. 21, 2023), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-rubin-38

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On August 26, 2020, at approximately 2:32 AM, Odom drove past two California Highway Patrol officers at 92 miles per hour, in violation of California law. ECF No. 1 at 5. The officers followed the vehicle and instructed Odom to stop, roll down the windows, and turn off the car. He complied immediately. Dashcam 1:04-1:12. After the car stopped, Officer Guajardo approached the passenger-side window and Officer Lee approached the driver’s side. Id. at 1:32-1:42. Officer Guajardo told Odom that he was speeding and asked for his license, insurance, and registration. ECF No. 1 at 5. Odom explained that he did not have any of those items, and his license was suspended, but provided Officer Guajardo with a California Identification card. Id. According to Officer Guajardo, Odom “was shifting and moving around in the vehicle” and “appeared nervous.” ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 5. Odom explained that the car belonged to his sister. Dashcam 2:22. A few seconds later, Officer Guajardo asked “How far are you from home?” Id. at 2:19, and Odom replied that it was “literally right up the street.” Id. at 2:21. When asked whether he was on probation or parole, Odom said he was not. ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 5.

The officers then conducted a DMV records check and a Criminal Records Information Management System (CRIM) check. The parties dispute whether Officer Guajardo ran both checks himself or whether he requested help from dispatch. Based on the DMV records check, Officer Guajardo learned that Odom’s license was withheld for failure to appear. From the CRIMS record check, Officer Guajardo learned “that Odom had affiliations with criminal gang activity and that Odom had firearms-related criminal history.” Id. ¶ 7.

Because Odom did not have a valid license, Officer Guajardo “planned to have the vehicle towed after the completion of the stop.” Id. ¶ 11. Officer Guajardo asked Odom to step out of the vehicle, conducted a pat-down search, and felt a firearm near Odom’s waistband. Id. Officer Guajardo removed the firearm, which contained one round of ammunition in the chamber, placed Odom in handcuffs, and then recovered 19 rounds of ammunition from Odom’s person. Id. Officer Guajardo then placed Odom under arrest pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Odom now moves to suppress the gun and ammunition found during the search because (1) Officer Guajardo unconstitutionally prolonged the stop by asking about Odom’s probation and parole status; (2) Officer Guajardo unconstitutionally prolonged the stop by running a CRIMS check on Mr. Odom; (3) the Government has not carried its burden of establishing that towing the car was lawful; (4) the Government has not shown that the pat-search was constitutional; and (5) the Government has not established any exception to the exclusionary rule. ECF Nos. 34; 42. The Government opposes the motion. ECF No. 39.

Full text here: United States v. Odom, 588 F. Supp. 3d 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2022), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-odom-69

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Based in San Diego, CA
Licensed: California, Nevada, and Federal Courts

The San Diego-based business litigation and criminal defense attorneys at LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM are experienced and dedicated professionals singularly focused on one goal: achieving the best results for our clients. Through our hard work and expertise, we guarantee all of our clients that we will diligently protect their rights and zealously pursue justice. Our clients deserve nothing less!