But intoxication alone does not preclude a valid waiver. See United States v. Figueroa-Serrano, 971 F.3d 806, 815 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding a valid Miranda waiver when the suspect, after using marijuana, did not appear affected by intoxication and told officers he understood his rights). Instead, the test is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the mental impairment “caused the defendant’s will to be overborne.” United States v. Jones, 842 F.3d 1077, 1083 (8th Cir. 2016).
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The San Diego-based business litigation and criminal defense attorneys at LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM are experienced and dedicated professionals singularly focused on one goal: achieving the best results for our clients. Through our hard work and expertise, we guarantee all of our clients that we will diligently protect their rights and zealously pursue justice. Our clients deserve nothing less!
Held: A state hospital’s performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient’s criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure. The interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine cannot justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 67–68, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1283, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001)
While state hospital employees, like other citizens, may have a duty to provide the police with evidence *85 of criminal conduct that they inadvertently acquire in the course of routine treatment, when they undertake to obtain such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients, they have a special obligation to make sure that the patients are fully informed about their constitutional rights, as standards of knowing waiver require.24 Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1292, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001)
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The San Diego-based business litigation and criminal defense attorneys at LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM are experienced and dedicated professionals singularly focused on one goal: achieving the best results for our clients. Through our hard work and expertise, we guarantee all of our clients that we will diligently protect their rights and zealously pursue justice. Our clients deserve nothing less!
Passenger and vehicle searches have played a prominent role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has consistently held that probable cause is necessary to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 160–62, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985).
In recent years, the Court has clarified that “[i]f there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity,” the search may extend to any area where evidence might be found. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)). In addition, when an arrest is made, a warrantless search is permitted “if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment … or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id. at 1723. But the Court has never sanctioned a vehicle search simply because there was probable cause to arrest a passenger or because a passenger could not provide identification. The Fourth Amendment requires more.
…
The focus of the arrest inquiry is different from that of the search inquiry. See Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir.1996). Officers have probable cause for an arrest if at the time of the arrest, “the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they [have] reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing” that the defendant committed an offense. *1029 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). Officers have probable cause for a search when “the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). “[T]here may be probable cause to search without probable cause to arrest, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.1(b) at 9 (3d ed. 1996)).
241 F.3d 638, 647–48 (9th Cir.2000).
Both the Supreme Court and this court have highlighted this distinction. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978) (“The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.”); United States v. O’Connor, 658 F.2d 688, 693 n. 7 (9th Cir.1981) (“Probable cause to arrest concerns the guilt of the arrestee, whereas probable cause to search an item concerns the connection of the items sought with the crime and the present location of the items.”); Millender v. County of Los Angeles, 620 F.3d 1016, 1029 n. 6 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc).
Read the case here: United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 2011), https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/09/07/10-30254.pdf
Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law https://lawstache.com
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Based in San Diego, CA
Licensed: California, Nevada, and Federal Courts
The San Diego-based business litigation and criminal defense attorneys at LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM are experienced and dedicated professionals singularly focused on one goal: achieving the best results for our clients. Through our hard work and expertise, we guarantee all of our clients that we will diligently protect their rights and zealously pursue justice. Our clients deserve nothing less!
🎉 SAN DIEGO CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER Anton Vialtsin from LAWSTACHE LAW FIRM will participate at the 2023 Ocean Beach Holiday Parade 🎉
Are you ready for a fantastic holiday season celebration? San Diego Criminal Defense Attorney Anton Vialtsin is thrilled to announce that LAWSTACHE LAW FIRM will be a part of the much-anticipated 2023 Ocean Beach Holiday Parade!
Get ready for a magical experience as we light up the Ocean Beach streets with joy, fun, and holiday spirit! San Diego Attorney Anton Vialtsin and our dedicated team are excited to be a part of this incredible community event, and we can’t wait to celebrate with you.
What to Expect:
🌟 Spectacular Floats: Our eye-catching float is designed to capture the holiday spirit, and it’s a sight you won’t want to miss.
🎶 Live Music along the parade route.
🍬 Candy and Souvenirs: We’ll be handing out sweet treats and FREE promotional goodies for parade-goers of all ages.
📸 Photo Opportunities: Snap a picture with our team and the fabulous float, and make lasting memories.
Join us in spreading holiday cheer, connecting with the community, and making this year’s Ocean Beach Holiday Parade unforgettable.
Don’t miss this chance to celebrate the season with LAWSTACHE LAW FIRM! Mark your calendars and be sure to come out to the parade. We look forward to seeing you there!
The “single-purpose container” exception to the warrant requirement originated in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), overruled on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). The central question in Sanders was “whether, in the absence of exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant before searching luggage taken from an automobile properly stopped and searched for contraband.” Id. at 754, 99 S.Ct. 2586. The Court answered this question in the affirmative, but declared:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.
Id. at 764 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 2586.
In Robbins v. California, a plurality of four justices elaborated on the “single-purpose container” exception, explaining that the exception is:
little more than another variation of the “plain view” exception,[7] since, if the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents, the contents cannot fairly be said to have been removed from a searching officer’s view. The same would be true, of course, if the container were transparent, or otherwise clearly revealed its contents. In short, the negative implication of footnote 13 of the Sanders opinion is that, unless the container is such that its contents may be said to be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment.
453 U.S. 420, 427, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 801*801 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).
Based in San Diego, CA
Licensed: California, Nevada, and Federal Courts
The San Diego-based business litigation and criminal defense attorneys at LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM are experienced and dedicated professionals singularly focused on one goal: achieving the best results for our clients. Through our hard work and expertise, we guarantee all of our clients that we will diligently protect their rights and zealously pursue justice. Our clients deserve nothing less!
A conspiracy, having for its object the commission of an offense denounced by the Bankruptcy Act, is not, in itself, an offense arising under that act within the meaning of § 29a thereof, and the one-year period of limitation prescribed by that section does not apply. We cannot agree that there is anything unreasonable or … Read more
It is undisputed that §4B1.2(a)(2) (https://guidelines.ussc.gov/gl/%C2%A74B1.2) lists robbery as one of the possible predicated offenses, but the analysis does not end there. To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence, the Court must use the categorical approach outlined in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). First, the Court needs … Read more
The District Court for the Southern District of California (Federal Court in San Diego and El Centro) issued a new order addressing concerns around the Coronavirus (Covid-19). The Court Order is linked below. All jury trials in civil and criminal cases in the Southern District of California are continued until April 16, 2020. Except as … Read more
Fits of rudeness or lack of gratitude may violate the Golden Rule. But that doesn’t make them illegal or for that matter punishable or for that matter grounds for a seizure.
Minard, a police officer in the city of Taylor, Michigan, stopped Cruise-Gulyas in June 2017 for speeding. But he decided to show her leniency and wrote her a ticket for a non-moving violation. As she drove away, Cruise-Gulyas repaid Minard’s kindness by raising her middle finger at him. Minard pulled Cruise-Gulyas over a second time, less than 100 yards from where the initial stop occurred, and amended the ticket to a speeding violation.
Fourth Amendment. Under the facts set forth in the complaint, Minard violated Cruise-Gulyas’s right to be free from an unreasonable seizure by stopping her a second time. All agree that Minard seized Cruise-Gulyas within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he pulled her over the second time. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996). To justify that stop, Minard needed probable cause that Cruise-Gulyas had committed a civil traffic violation, id. at 810, or reasonable suspicion that she had committed a crime, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). He could not rely on the driving infraction to satisfy that requirement. Any authority to seize her in connection with that infraction ended when the first stop concluded. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609,1614 (2015).
First Amendment. Cruise-Gulyas also alleges that Minard violated her free speech rights by stopping her the second time in retaliation for her expressive, if vulgar, gesture. To succeed, she must show that (1) she engaged in protected conduct, (2) Minard took an adverse action against her that would deter an ordinary person from continuing to engage in that conduct, and (3) her protected conduct motivated Minard at least in part. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
In his reply brief, Minard analogizes his case to a prosecutor who might reasonably think he could take a plea deal off the table if a defendant behaved offensively or a judge who might reasonably think that she could increase a defendant’s sentence if the defendant raised his middle finger at her right after she read her sentence from the bench. Judges, it is true, have wide latitude to consider expressive conduct during sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; United States v. White Twin, 682 F.3d 773, 778–79 (8th Cir. 2012). But we need not wade through those complicated questions now because these facts differ materially. As alleged, the first stop had ended, a constitutionally significant event, before the officer initiated the second, unjustified stop. The Supreme Court has said that any justification for the first stop ceases when that stop ends. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. These facts more closely resemble a prosecutor who tries to revoke a defendant’s deal a few days after everyone has agreed to it or a judge who hauls the defendant back into court a week or two after imposing a sentence based on the defendant’s after-the-fact speech. Those examples seem more problematic and more in keeping with today’s decision. Minard, in short, clearly had no proper basis for seizing Cruise-Gulyas a second time.
Anton Vialtsin, Esq. LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law https://lawstache.com https://russiansandiegoattorney.com 185 West F Street Suite 100-D San Diego, CA 92101 (619) 357-6677
Based in San Diego, CA Licensed: California, Nevada, and Federal Courts
The San Diego-based business litigation and criminal defense attorneys at LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM are experienced and dedicated professionals singularly focused on one goal: achieving the best results for our clients. Through our hard work and expertise, we guarantee all of our clients that we will diligently protect their rights and zealously pursue justice. Our clients deserve nothing less!
In United States v. Knapp, officers searched the defendant’s purse despite the fact that she was handcuffed behind her back, her purse was closed and three to four feet behind her, and three officers who were present had exclusive possession of the purse since cuffing the defendant.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” In general, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The warrantless search rule, however, is subject to several exceptions. One exception allows arresting officers to “search the person of the accused when legally arrested.” Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
Case law has developed to allow not only the search of the arrestee’s person, but also the area within the arrestee’s “immediate control.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). This authority is justified by the need to disarm the suspect and preserve evidence. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
“Of the Person” The Supreme Court has not clearly demarcated where the person ends and the “grab area” begins. The 10th Circuit resolves this question, and it holds that the better view is that a carried purse does not qualify as “of the person.” First, because of an arrestee’s ability to always access weapons concealed in her clothing or pockets, an officer must necessarily search those areas because it would be impractical (not to mention demeaning) to separate the arrestee from her clothing. Second, given that handheld containers such as purses are easily dispossessed, classifying such containers as potentially part of an arrestee’s person would necessitate unworkable determinations about what the arrestee was holding at the exact time of her arrest. Third, a holding to the contrary would erode the distinction between the arrestee’s person and the area within her immediate control.
“Immediate Control” This question depends on whether the purse was within the area the arresting officers could “reasonably have believed . . . [the arrestee] could have accessed . . . at the time of the search.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009) (emphasis added).
The 10th Circuit looked to the following factors to determine whether an area searched is within an arrestee’s grab area under Chimel: (1) whether the arrestee is handcuffed; (2) the relative number of arrestees and officers present; (3) the relative positions of the arrestees, officers, and the place to be searched; and (4) the ease or difficulty with which the arrestee could gain access to the searched area. United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1066 (10th Cir. 1993)
Full Opinion: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/18/18-8031.pdf
Anton Vialtsin, Esq. LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law https://lawstache.com https://russiansandiegoattorney.com 185 West F Street Suite 100-D San Diego, CA 92101 (619) 357-6677
Based in San Diego, CA Licensed: California, Nevada, and Federal Courts
The San Diego-based business litigation and criminal defense attorneys at LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM are experienced and dedicated professionals singularly focused on one goal: achieving the best results for our clients. Through our hard work and expertise, we guarantee all of our clients that we will diligently protect their rights and zealously pursue justice. Our clients deserve nothing less!
Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
Anton Vialtsin, Esq.