What types of cases does Lawstache Law Firm handle?

We defend clients in federal and California state cases including drug crimes, DUI, domestic violence, white-collar fraud, firearm charges, and violent crimes.

Do you offer free consultations?

Yes, we offer free consultations. Call 619-357-6677 to speak directly with attorney Anton Vialtsin.

Where is Lawstache Law Firm located?

We are located at 185 West F Street, Suite 100-D, San Diego, CA 92101. We represent clients across San Diego County, Orange County, and beyond.

What makes LAWSTACHE different from other San Diego criminal defense attorneys?

We provide personalized attention, direct access to your attorney, and extensive experience in both federal and California state criminal defense.

Do you handle federal criminal cases?

Yes, Anton Vialtsin specializes in federal defense, including drug importation, alien smuggling, fraud, and firearms charges.

Do you handle DUI and drug possession cases?

Yes, our firm handles DUIs, drug possession, and related offenses.

Do you handle domestic violence cases?

Yes, we defend clients in domestic violence cases and restraining order matters.

Do you handle theft, burglary, and property crimes?

Yes, we represent clients facing theft, burglary, and other property crime charges in San Diego County.

Do you handle white-collar crimes?

Yes, our team defends clients against white-collar crimes including fraud, embezzlement, and financial crimes.

How do I contact a San Diego criminal defense attorney at LAWSTACHE?

You can call 619-357-6677 to speak directly with Anton Vialtsin for a free consultation or use our contact form on the Contact page.

Blog - Page 15 of 20 - LAWSTACHE LAW FIRM

Florida Federal Judge tosses suit challenging GUN BAN for medical marijuana patients. (POST-BRUEN)

October 10, 2023 by LAWSTACHE

Federal law prohibits certain people from possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). Among them are convicted felons, fugitives from justice, and—relevant here—anyone “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.” Id. As the parties agree, Florida’s medical marijuana users are “unlawful user[s] of . . . [a] controlled substance,” so this law makes it a crime for them to possess firearms. The primary issue in this case is whether the Second Amendment allows this result.

In 2016, Florida stopped criminalizing the medical use of marijuana. Many people refer to this change as Florida’s “legalizing” medical marijuana, but Florida did no such thing. It couldn’t. “Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, state laws cannot permit what federal law prohibits,” United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1179 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016), and federal law still prohibits possession of marijuana—for medical purposes or otherwise, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a); see also 21 U.S.C. § 812, Sch. I(c)(10), § 812(b)(1)(B). Indeed, federal law “designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose” and “prohibit[s] entirely [its] possession.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24, 27 (2005).

So while Florida (like many states) has decided it will no longer criminalize medical marijuana, the simple fact is that “[a]nyone in any state who possesses, distributes, or manufactures marijuana for medical or recreational purposes . . . is committing a federal crime.” McIntosh, 833 F.3d at 1179.

As anyone driving by Florida’s many marijuana dispensaries can see, though, federal law is not always enforced. Congress has precluded the Department of Justice (for now) from prosecuting crimes that Congress (for now) chooses to maintain on the books.

Three Plaintiffs want to participate in Florida’s medical marijuana system while possessing guns. But as things stand, their use of medical marijuana—their “unlawful use[] . . . of a controlled substance”—makes any gun possession a felony, punishable by up to 15 years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8). That is the situation Plaintiffs challenge. They contend that this violates their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. And they contend a federal firearms prosecution would violate the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment.

…

The Second Amendment guarantees the individual right to possess firearms. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). Judges, scholars, and others have long debated the extent of this right, and many questions remain unresolved. But the Supreme Court recently clarified that the government cannot restrict the Second Amendment right unless “the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2126 (2022). It is not enough to “simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest.” Id

Put differently, if there is a tradition of regulation that is relevantly similar to the challenged laws, Plaintiffs have not stated a plausible Second Amendment claim.

The government offers two historical analogues. ECF No. 14 at 31-32. It contends that laws have traditionally kept guns from those engaged in criminal activity and from “those whose status or behavior would make it dangerous for them to possess firearms.” Id. The government offers a second historical analogue: the tradition of keeping firearms from “those whose possession of firearms the government deems dangerous.”

At bottom, the historical tradition of keeping guns from those the government fairly views as dangerous—like alcoholics and the mentally ill—is sufficiently analogous to modern laws keeping guns from habitual users of controlled substances.

Full case here: Fried v. Garland, No. 4:22-CV-164-AW-MAF, 2022 WL 16731233 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2022), https://reason.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Fried-v-Garland-dismissal-11-4-22.pdf

Bruen Explained: https://youtu.be/XxLRHhss55Y

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
https://lawstache.com
(619) 357-6677

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https://lawstache.com/results-notable-cases/

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Based in San Diego, CA
Licensed: California, Nevada, and Federal Courts

The San Diego-based business litigation and criminal defense attorneys at LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM are experienced and dedicated professionals singularly focused on one goal: achieving the best results for our clients. Through our hard work and expertise, we guarantee all of our clients that we will diligently protect their rights and zealously pursue justice. Our clients deserve nothing less!

What is the Single-Purpose Container exception to 4th Amendment warrant requirement?

October 10, 2023 by LAWSTACHE

The “single-purpose container” exception to the warrant requirement originated in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), overruled on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). The central question in Sanders was “whether, in the absence of exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant before searching luggage taken from an automobile properly stopped and searched for contraband.” Id. at 754, 99 S.Ct. 2586. The Court answered this question in the affirmative, but declared:

Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.
Id. at 764 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 2586.

In Robbins v. California, a plurality of four justices elaborated on the “single-purpose container” exception, explaining that the exception is:

little more than another variation of the “plain view” exception,[7] since, if the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents, the contents cannot fairly be said to have been removed from a searching officer’s view. The same would be true, of course, if the container were transparent, or otherwise clearly revealed its contents. In short, the negative implication of footnote 13 of the Sanders opinion is that, unless the container is such that its contents may be said to be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment.
453 U.S. 420, 427, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 801*801 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

Full case here: US v. Gust, 405 F. 3d 797 – Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 2005, https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13976317218493731054&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr#p807

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
https://lawstache.com
(619) 357-6677

Do you want to buy our Lawstache merchandise? Maybe a t-shirt?
https://lawstache.com/merch/

Want to mail me something (usually mustache related)? Send it to 185 West F Street, Suite 100-D, San Diego, CA 92101

Want to learn about our recent victories?
https://lawstache.com/results-notable-cases/

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Based in San Diego, CA
Licensed: California, Nevada, and Federal Courts

Child can’t waive privacy rights of her parents and does not have authority to consent to a search.

October 3, 2023 by LAWSTACHE

Although parents may choose to grant their minor children joint access and mutual use of the home, parents normally retain control of the home as well as the power to rescind the authority they have given. “It does not startle us that a parent’s consent to a search of the living room in the absence of his minor child is given effect; but we should not allow the police to rely on the consent of the child to bind the parent. The common sense of the matter is that the … parent has not surrendered his privacy of place in the living room to the discretion of the … child; rather, the latter [has] privacy of place there in the discretion of the former.” (Weinreb, supra, 42 U.Chi.L.Rev. at p. 60; see People v. Jennings, supra, 142 Cal.App.2d at p. 168.)

Other courts that have considered the authority, or capacity, of a minor child to consent to a police entry of the family home generally have refused to uphold the admissibility of evidence found therein in a criminal action against the parent. The reasoning of these cases is sound: a child cannot waive the privacy rights of her parents.

Full case here: People v. Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-jacobs-23503

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
https://lawstache.com
(619) 357-6677

Do you want to buy our Lawstache merchandise? Maybe a t-shirt?
https://lawstache.com/merch/

Want to mail me something (usually mustache related)? Send it to 185 West F Street, Suite 100-D, San Diego, CA 92101

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Based in San Diego, CA
Licensed: California, Nevada, and Federal Courts

Opening box truck’s cargo door constitutes a search under 4th Amendment and police needed a WARRANT.

October 3, 2023 by LAWSTACHE

Yuen contends, inter alia, that Officer Kline’s opening the rear cargo door without his permission violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and, therefore, all evidence the government obtained through exploitation of that illegality must be suppressed as “ ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ ” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). We assume, without deciding, that the officers’ conduct up until the time that Officer Kline opened the rear cargo door without permission did not violate the Fourth Amendment. However, Officer Kline’s opening of the rear cargo door constituted a search for purposes of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569, 1572-73 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc ) (police conducted “search” of hotel room for Fourth Amendment purposes when they gained visual entry into room through door that was opened at their command and while they stood in hotel corridor). Accordingly, in order for the search to be justified under the Fourth Amendment, at least one of the following two circumstances must have existed: (1) probable cause to believe the rear cargo area contained contraband or evidence of a crime, United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 491 (9th Cir.1985) (“[P]robable cause alone suffices to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place, as long as the scope of the search is reasonable.”), or (2) the officers had an objectively reasonable fear of an immediate threat for their safety, see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (during investigatory stop of automobile pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), police officer may search for weapons in passenger compartment, “limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, … if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these circumstances existed in the present case. There was absolutely nothing specific about the tip the officers received, nor about the circumstances in which they came upon the truck, that provided any grounds for a reasonable fear that they were in danger. Also, the officers identified the sound they heard coming from the cargo area as “drilling.” Coming, as it did, from an individual in the parking lot of a home improvement store, such activity would not render a “reasonably prudent man in such circumstances [to] be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id. at 1050, 103 S.Ct. 3469. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s partial denial of Yuen’s motion to suppress, vacate the judgment, and remand to permit Yuen to withdraw his guilty plea. See *745 United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584, 593 (9th Cir.2004) (similar disposition).

Full case here: United States v. Yuen, 113 F. App’x 742 (9th Cir. 2004)

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
https://lawstache.com
(619) 357-6677

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Based in San Diego, CA
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Can police search a motorcycle saddlebag without a warrant as incident to arrest?

August 23, 2023 by LAWSTACHE

Defendant Hall was arrested at approximately 2:30 p.m. on May 14, 2008 after he exited a house trailer at 2233 East 8th Street, Lot 340, Pueblo, Colorado. Agents had an active arrest warrant and there is no dispute the arrest itself was legal. Immediately before the arrest, agents had observed Hall and a female companion leave another residence and travel on Hall’s motorcycle to the house trailer. One officer, situated approximately 75 yards away, saw Hall near the saddle bag hanging over the rear tire of the motorcycle. At that distance he could not discern whether Hall opened the saddlebag, put something in or took something out. No officer in closer proximity testified to this saddlebag event. The officers watched the couple enter the house trailer. The couple remained inside for a period of time that has been estimated by various witnesses to range from five minutes to half an hour. The time spent inside is not critical to the issue presented on this Motion to Suppress.

Officers saw the couple leave the house trailer and as Hall was approaching the motorcycle he was placed under arrest. From a conflict in the testimony, I find that Hall was much more than an arm’s length distance from the motorcycle. Following the arrest and placing Hall in custody, the officers conducted a search of the motorcycle. The saddlebag was closed and fastened with a strap. The saddlebag was opened and in it was found approximately 100 grams of methamphetamine in three baggies, a 22 caliber Lorcin handgun and $6,000 cash. The question presented is whether the search of the motorcycle and saddlebag was incident to the arrest and thus did not require a warrant. I find it was not, and therefore the search was unreasonable as a matter of law.

In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763-64, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), for example, the Court established an exception to allow the contemporaneous search of a lawfully arrested person and the immediately surrounding area without a warrant in order to promote safety and prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.

Supreme Court in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), established a bright-line rule specific to automobile searches incident to arrest. “When a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile” and “examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment.” Id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860. See also United States v. Franco, 981 F.2d 470, 472 (10th Cir.1992). The rule from Belton is based on the “generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or [evidence].” Belton at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860. Under this same rationale, the Court expressly noted the passenger compartment did not encompass the trunk of the automobile, leaving it beyond the scope of a permissible search incident to arrest. Id. at 460 n. 4, 101 S.Ct. 2860.

Full case here: United States v. Hall, 603 F.Supp.2d 1308 (2009), https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9666803275967635642&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
https://lawstache.com
(619) 357-6677

Do you want to buy our Lawstache merchandise? Maybe a t-shirt?
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PART 2 of Howard Case. Officer threatens a motorcyclist that he will search the rider’s backpack.

August 23, 2023 by LAWSTACHE

Police search backpack. As mentioned at the outset, the dialogue between Ruffin and Howard on the side of the road had a certain unreality to it. A number of times, Ruffin seemed to go out of his way to tell Howard that he was not under arrest—even when Howard was in handcuffs and would not likely have believed he was free to terminate the encounter. Why did Ruffin go to such great lengths to communicate this message to Howard, notwithstanding the reality of the situation?

Although we don’t know for sure what was going through Ruffin’s mind, the answer is likely that he was following his training. California law enforcement agencies apparently train their officers to tell suspects that they are not under arrest, on the theory that these magic words allow officers to keep questioning suspects without advising them of their Miranda rights, even if it is otherwise obvious that the suspects are in custody and therefore entitled to Miranda ‘s protective admonitions. See, e.g. , Smith v. Clark , 612 Fed.Appx. 418, 424 (9th Cir.2015) (unpublished) (Watford, J., concurring).

Why, in turn, do law enforcement agencies train their officers to circumvent Miranda in this way? Apparently it is based on a series of court decisions that give “essentially dispositive weight” to these magic words, immunizing the government from adverse Miranda rulings in cases where the suspect cannot possibly have felt free to leave. Id. at 423 ; see also Smith v. Clark , 804 F.3d 983, 986–87 (9th Cir.2015) (W. Fletcher, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). In other words, law enforcement agencies train officers to work their way around Miranda because courts have signed off on the workaround.

In some cases, perhaps this practice helps officers obtain evidence when a suspect would otherwise clam up. But if Ruffin was following this practice here, it backfired. Because Ruffin made clear he was not in the process of arresting Howard when he announced he was going to search the backpack, Howard’s statements following that announcement, and the gun found in the backpack, must be suppressed.

Full case here: United States v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 3d 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2016), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-howard-306

(Sorry about the AUDIO issues in this recording)

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
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(619) 357-6677

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Officer threatens suspect that he will search his backpack in violation of the 4th Amendment, Part 1

August 23, 2023 by LAWSTACHE

In this case, a highway patrol officer announced he was going to search a suspect’s backpack. That search would have violated the Fourth Amendment, because the officer did not have a warrant to search the backpack, and no exception to the warrant requirement applied at the time the officer made his announcement. In response to the officer’s threat, the suspect confessed to being a felon and having a gun in the backpack. The government has now charged him with being a felon in possession of a firearm. But the government may not use in court evidence that an officer obtains through a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment. Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 462–63, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) ; United States v. Saafir , 754 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir.2014). Therefore, the evidence the officer obtained as a result of his threat (specifically, the confession and the gun) must be suppressed.

Full case here: United States v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 3d 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2016), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-howard-306

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
https://lawstache.com
(619) 357-6677

Do you want to buy our Lawstache merchandise? Maybe a t-shirt?
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Want to mail me something (usually mustache related)? Send it to 185 West F Street, Suite 100-D, San Diego, CA 92101

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Border Patrol SEARCH cell phone WITHOUT a WARRANT by relying on search incident to arrest exception.

August 18, 2023 by LAWSTACHE

Search Incident to Arrest

A search incident to a lawful arrest is an exception to the general rule that warrantless searches violate the Fourth Amendment. The exception allows a police officer making a lawful arrest to conduct a search of the area within the arrestee’s “immediate control,” that is, “the area from within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009).

The Exigency Exception

Under the exigency exception, officers may make a warrantless search if: (1) they have probable cause to believe that the item or place to be searched contains evidence of a crime, and (2) they are facing exigent circumstances that require immediate police action. See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–301, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (upholding a warrantless search where “the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative”). We have defined exigent circumstances as “those circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry [or search] … was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.” United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Estate of Merchant v. Comm’r, 947 F.2d 1390, 1392–93 (9th Cir.1991). To be reasonable, a search under this exception must be limited in scope so that it is “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Reyes–Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir.2010) ( “In order to prove that the exigent circumstances doctrine justified a warrantless search, the government must [also] show that … the search’s scope and manner were reasonable to meet the need.”).

The Vehicle Exception

Another exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is the vehicle exception. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Under the vehicle exception, officers may search a vehicle and any containers found therein without a warrant, so long as they have probable cause. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) ; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821–22, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). Unlike search incident to arrest, the vehicle exception is not rooted in arrest and the Chimel rationales of preventing arrestees from harming officers and destroying evidence. Instead, the vehicle exception is motivated by the supposedly lower expectation of privacy individuals have in their vehicles as well as the mobility of vehicles, which allows evidence contained within those vehicles to be easily concealed from the police. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S.Ct. 280 ; California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985).

Full case here: United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2014), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-camou-4

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
https://lawstache.com
(619) 357-6677

Do you want to buy our Lawstache merchandise? Maybe a t-shirt?
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Want to mail me something (usually mustache related)? Send it to 185 West F Street, Suite 100-D, San Diego, CA 92101

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Charged with burglary despite not having any burglary tools and claiming to be visiting his cousin.

August 18, 2023 by LAWSTACHE

Burglary attorney. Early one October morning, defendant Isaiah Hendrix walked up to a house in **281 Oxnard, knocked on the door, and rang the doorbell. Hearing no response, Hendrix walked around the house to the backyard, opened a screen door, and attempted to open the locked glass door behind it. Then, failing that, Hendrix sat down on a bench and stayed there. Hendrix was sitting on the bench when police arrived. Hendrix told police he was there to visit his cousin, but Hendrix’s cousin did not, in fact, live in the house. Hendrix was charged with burglary.

At trial, the court gave the jury a standard mistake of fact instruction, which informed jurors that they should not convict Hendrix if they determined he lacked criminal intent because he mistakenly believed a relevant fact — namely, that the house belonged to his cousin and not to a stranger. But the instruction specified that the mistake in question had to be a reasonable one. All parties now acknowledge this was error: To negate the specific criminal intent required for burglary, a defendant’s mistaken belief need not be reasonable, just genuinely held. The question before us is whether the instructional error was prejudicial and thus requires reversal. The Court of Appeal, concluding Hendrix’s claim of mistake was not credible in any event, answered no. We reach a different conclusion. The instructional error effectively precluded the jury from giving full consideration to a mistake of fact claim that was supported by substantial evidence, where resolution of the issue was central to the question whether Hendrix possessed the criminal intent necessary for conviction. Whether that claim is credible is a matter for a jury to decide. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings.

Full case here: Burglary attorney. People v. Hendrix, 13 Cal.5th 933 (2022), https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S265668.PDF

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
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(619) 357-6677

Do you want to buy our Lawstache merchandise? Maybe a t-shirt?
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You can reach our office by calling (619) 357-6677.

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Acceptance of responsibility levels under § 3.E1.1 of the federal sentencing guidelines.

August 18, 2023 by LAWSTACHE

Wilke contends that the district court erred by denying him the adjustment solely because of the time and money the Government spent before and at trial. According to Wilke, § 3.E1.1(a) of the Guidelines focuses only on whether, in its words, “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense,” not on whether he saves Government resources. Saving the Government resources is, rather, the basis for a separate 1-point reduction under § 3E1.1(b).

Whether USSG § 3.E1.1(a) permits consideration of the Government’s
expenditure of resources is a legal question this Court reviews de novo. United States v. Dixon, 984 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 2020). We conclude that it does not. We are persuaded by the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Hollis, 823 F.3d 1045 (6th Cir. 2016), where it determined that USSG § 3.E1.1(a) is “[b]y its plain terms . . . focused only on whether the defendant ‘clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility,’ while subsection (b) . . . is focused only on whether the defendant[] . . . permit[s] the government to avoid preparing for trial and permit[s] the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently.” Id. at 1048 (quotations omitted). Considering the Government’s expenditure of resources under subsection (a) risks rendering “parts of § 3E1.1(b) superfluous,” because “[i]f waste of government resources could be a basis for denying the two-level decrease under subsection (a), then there would never be a situation where a defendant would qualify for the decrease under subsection (a) but then be denied the additional decrease under subsection (b) for the reason that his or her late-in-time guilty plea caused the government to waste resources preparing for trial.” Id.

Full case here: USA V. JUSTIN WILKE, https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2022/09/14/21-30228.pdf

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
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