The Second Amendment is not a “second class right.” No longer can courts balance away a constitutional right. After Bruen, the Government must prove that laws regulating conduct covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text align with this Nation’s historical tradition. The Government does not meet that burden. Although not exhaustive, the Court’s historical survey finds little evidence that § 922(n)—which prohibits those under felony indictment from obtaining a firearm—aligns with this Nation’s historical tradition. As a result, this Court holds that § 922(n) is unconstitutional
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Until recently, federal courts uniformly applied at least intermediate scrutiny to firearms laws and conducted a means-end analysis to determine whether the state’s interest in the regulation was sufficient to overcome whatever burden the law placed on one’s Second Amendment right. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2012). In Bruen, however, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that all of the lower courts had been incorrect in applying means-end scrutiny. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). Rather than
balancing any government interest, no matter how important the interest may be in our modern society, the Supreme Court reaffirmed what it said in Heller: “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them.” Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008)) (emphasis in original). Because the Second Amendment was adopted in 1791, only those regulations that would have been considered constitutional then can be constitutional now.
Supreme Court provided the following mandate:
To justify its regulation, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
Section 922(k) criminalizes the mere possession of a firearm after a serial number is removed, obliterated, or altered in any way, whether or not the firearm is then placed into commerce.
Any modern regulation that does not comport with the historical understanding of the right is to be deemed unconstitutional, regardless of how desirable or important that regulation may be in our modern society.
It is undisputed that serial numbers were not required, or even in common use, in 1791. Rather, serial numbers arose only with the advent of the mass production of firearms. The first legal requirement for serial numbers did not appear until 1934 when Congress passed the National Firearms Act. That requirement only applied to certain firearms, such as machine guns and short-barreled rifles. The first precursor to Section 922(k) appeared in the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 and made it unlawful “for any person to transport, ship, or knowingly receive in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm from which the manufacturer’s serial number has been removed, obliterated, or altered.” Pub. L. No. 75-785, § 2(i), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 (1938).
Serial numbers were not broadly required for all firearms manufactured and imported in the United States until the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968.
Notably, these prohibitions were only on transporting, shipping, or receiving firearms—that is to say, when the firearms were in the stream of commerce. Even in 1968 there was no prohibition on mere possession of a firearm that had the serial number altered or removed. In fact, it was not until the Crime Control Act of 1990 that Section 922 was amended to insert “or to possess or receive any firearm which has had the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered and has, at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2202(b), 104 Stat. 4789, 4856 (1990)
Conclusion: It is difficult to imagine that this societal problem did
not exist at the founding. While firearms then were not the same as firearms today, there certainly were gun crimes that might have been more easily investigated if firearms had to be identifiable by a serial number or other mark. The Government has presented no evidence, and the court is not aware of any, that any such requirement existed in 1791.
Full case here: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. RANDY PRICE, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:22-cr-00097, https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts
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Federal law prohibits certain people from possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). Among them are convicted felons, fugitives from justice, and—relevant here—anyone “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.” Id. As the parties agree, Florida’s medical marijuana users are “unlawful user[s] of . . . [a] controlled substance,” so this law makes it a crime for them to possess firearms. The primary issue in this case is whether the Second Amendment allows this result.
In 2016, Florida stopped criminalizing the medical use of marijuana. Many people refer to this change as Florida’s “legalizing” medical marijuana, but Florida did no such thing. It couldn’t. “Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, state laws cannot permit what federal law prohibits,” United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1179 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016), and federal law still prohibits possession of marijuana—for medical purposes or otherwise, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a); see also 21 U.S.C. § 812, Sch. I(c)(10), § 812(b)(1)(B). Indeed, federal law “designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose” and “prohibit[s] entirely [its] possession.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24, 27 (2005).
So while Florida (like many states) has decided it will no longer criminalize medical marijuana, the simple fact is that “[a]nyone in any state who possesses, distributes, or manufactures marijuana for medical or recreational purposes . . . is committing a federal crime.” McIntosh, 833 F.3d at 1179.
As anyone driving by Florida’s many marijuana dispensaries can see, though, federal law is not always enforced. Congress has precluded the Department of Justice (for now) from prosecuting crimes that Congress (for now) chooses to maintain on the books.
Three Plaintiffs want to participate in Florida’s medical marijuana system while possessing guns. But as things stand, their use of medical marijuana—their “unlawful use[] . . . of a controlled substance”—makes any gun possession a felony, punishable by up to 15 years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8). That is the situation Plaintiffs challenge. They contend that this violates their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. And they contend a federal firearms prosecution would violate the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment.
…
The Second Amendment guarantees the individual right to possess firearms. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). Judges, scholars, and others have long debated the extent of this right, and many questions remain unresolved. But the Supreme Court recently clarified that the government cannot restrict the Second Amendment right unless “the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2126 (2022). It is not enough to “simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest.” Id
Put differently, if there is a tradition of regulation that is relevantly similar to the challenged laws, Plaintiffs have not stated a plausible Second Amendment claim.
The government offers two historical analogues. ECF No. 14 at 31-32. It contends that laws have traditionally kept guns from those engaged in criminal activity and from “those whose status or behavior would make it dangerous for them to possess firearms.” Id. The government offers a second historical analogue: the tradition of keeping firearms from “those whose possession of firearms the government deems dangerous.”
At bottom, the historical tradition of keeping guns from those the government fairly views as dangerous—like alcoholics and the mentally ill—is sufficiently analogous to modern laws keeping guns from habitual users of controlled substances.
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Possession of ammunition. In a per curiam opinion, the panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Sergio Guerrero’s motion to suppress because of the consistent conclusions of Judge Gould and Judge Bea, which represent a majority of the panel, even though the reasoning of Judge Gould and Judge Bea in their separate concurrences is different.
The panel noted that one exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of searches and seizures conducted without prior approval by judge or magistrate is a Terry stop, which allows an officer to briefly detain an
individual when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that an individual is engaged in a crime, during which stop an officer may also conduct a limited protective frisk if the officer has reason to believe the individual has a weapon. The panel noted that another exception is when an officer has probable cause to arrest an individual.
Judge Gould concurred on the grounds that Trooper Amick effected a de facto arrest supported by probable cause.
Although the possession of ammunition was not illegal in Arizona, the
extremely large volume of ammunition here raises risks to society that needed to be assessed more carefully and could not be done by a lone state trooper. The federal authorities, with their special expertise and databases, were properly invited to assess the situation before Guerrero was sent on his way with the ammunition. It was reasonable for Trooper Amick to believe this, and reasonableness is indeed the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment so far as searches and detentions are concerned.
Judge Bea concurred on the grounds that Trooper Amick merely detained Guerrero and did not effectuate a de facto arrest, but that even if Trooper Amick had arrested Guerrero, there was probable cause to do so.
Dissenting, Judge Thomas wrote that Trooper Amick’s stop ripened into an arrest when he held Guerrero handcuffed, on a roadside, for approximately 40 minutes, waiting for federal officers to arrive; and that Trooper Amick had no probable cause to do so.
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