Few statements in the law are as often repeated: “[A]n investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.” ( In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957].) The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures dictates that traffic stops must be supported by articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver or a passenger has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. ( People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 785].) In this case, the police officer who conducted the traffic stop did so on a mere hunch that the defendant and his passenger were involved in criminal activity. In other words, the facts known to the officer were insufficient to support the objectively reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a detention under the Fourth Amendment.
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The starting point for our analysis of whether the INS had reasonable suspicion to stop Serrano is United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment prohibits INS roving patrols from stopping vehicles in areas near but not at the Mexican border or its functional equivalent and from questioning a vehicle’s occupants as to citizenship absent a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains illegal aliens.
Id. at 882, 95 S.Ct. at 2580. Such a reasonable suspicion must be supported by “specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion” that the vehicle contains illegal aliens. Id. at 884, 95 S.Ct. at 2582. Factors that may properly be considered include (1) characteristics of the area where the vehicle is encountered, such as proximity to the border, usual traffic patterns, and previous experience with alien traffic; (2) information about recent illegal border crossings; (3) erratic or evasive driving; (4) characteristics of the vehicle itself—whether it is among those types frequently used to transport aliens, whether it appears heavily loaded or has an unusually large number of passengers or its passengers are observed trying to hide; and (5), although not sufficient standing alone, the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants.
Id. at 884–85, 887. The officer making the decision whether to stop is entitled to assess these factors in “light of his experience detecting illegal entry and smuggling.” Id. at 885, 95 S.Ct. at 2582 (citation omitted). Whether the INS had a reasonable suspicion requires a case-by-case analysis turning on the totality of the particular circumstances. Id. at 884 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. at 2582 n. 10.
Read the full case here: United States v. Ortega-Serrano, 788 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1986)
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The panel reversed the district court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from warrantless searches of his cell phone by Customs and Border Protection officials, and vacated his conviction for importing cocaine.
Applying United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9thCir. 2013) (en banc), the panel held that manual cell phone searches maybe conducted by border officials without reasonable suspicion but that forensic cell phone searches require reasonable suspicion. The panel clarified Cotterman by holding that “reasonable suspicion” in this context means that officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains digital contraband. The panel further concluded that cell phone searches at the border, whether manual or forensic, must be limited in scope to whether the phone contains digital contraband; and that a broader search for evidence of a crime cannot be justified by the purposes of the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The panel held that to the extent that a Border Patrol agent’s search of the defendant’s phone – which included the recording of phone numbers and text messages for further processing– went beyond a verification that the phone lacked digital contraband, the search exceeded the proper scope of aborder search and was unreasonable as a border search under the Fourth Amendment.
The panel held that although the agents had reason to suspect the defendant’s phone would contain evidence leading to additional drugs, the record does not give rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion that the digital data in the phone contained contraband, and the border search exception therefore did not authorize the agents to conduct a warrantless forensic search of the defendant’s phone. The panel held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply because the border officials did not rely on binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing the cell phone searches at issue here.
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Respondent Mena and others were detained in handcuffs during a search of the premises they occupied. Petitioners were lead members of a police detachment executing a search warrant of these premises for, inter alia, deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued the officers under 42 U. S. C. §1983, and the District Court found in her favor. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the use of handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers’ questioning of Mena about her immigration status during the detention constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation.
HELD:
1. Mena’s detention in handcuffs for the length of the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. That detention is consistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 705, in which the Court held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority “to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” The Court there noted that minimizing the risk of harm to officers is a substantial justification for detaining an occupant during a search, id., at 702–703, and ruled that an officer’s authority to detain incident to a search is categorical and does not depend on the “quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure,” id., at 705, n. 19. Because a warrant existed to search the premises and Mena was an occupant of the premises at the time of the search, her detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under Summers. Inherent in Summers’ authorization to detain is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396. The use of force in the form of handcuffs to detain Mena was reasonable because the governmental interest in minimizing the risk of harm to both officers and occupants, at its maximum when a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises, outweighs the marginal intrusion. See id., at 396–397. Moreover, the need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 414. Although the duration of a detention can affect the balance of interests, the 2- to 3-hour detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the government’s continuing safety interests. Pp. 4–7.
2. The officers’ questioning of Mena about her immigration status during her detention did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary appears premised on the assumption that the officers were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to so question Mena. However, this Court has “held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434. Because Mena’s initial detention was lawful and the Ninth Circuit did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, no additional Fourth Amendment justification for inquiring about Mena’s immigration status was required. Cf. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. ___ , ___ (slip op., at 2–4). Pp. 7–8.
3. Because the Ninth Circuit did not address Mena’s alternative argument that her detention extended beyond the time the police completed the tasks incident to the search, this Court declines to address it. See, e.g., Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U. S. 129, 148, n. 10. Pp. 8–9.
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Respondents’ private residence was damaged by an early morning fire while they were out of town. Firefighters extinguished the blaze at 7:04 a.m., at which time all fire officials and police left the premises. Five hours later, a team of arson investigators arrived at the residence for the first time to investigate the cause of the blaze. They found a work crew on the scene boarding up the house and pumping water out of the basement. The investigators learned that respondents had been notified of the fire and had instructed their insurance agent to send the crew to secure the house. Nevertheless, the investigators entered the residence and conducted an extensive search without obtaining either consent or an administrative warrant. Their search began in the basement where they found two Coleman fuel cans and a crock pot attached to an electrical timer. The investigators determined that the fire had been caused by the crock pot and timer and had been set deliberately. After seizing and marking the evidence found in the basement, the investigators extended their search to the upper portions of the house where they found additional evidence of arson. Respondents were charged with arson and moved to suppress all the evidence seized in the warrantless search on the ground that it was obtained in violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Michigan trial court denied the motion on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the search. On interlocutory appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that no exigent circumstances existed and reversed.
Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Justice POWELL, joined by Justice BRENNAN, Justice WHITE, and Justice MARSHALL, concluded that where reasonable expectations of privacy remain in fire-damaged premises, administrative searches into the cause and origin of a fire are **644 subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment absent consent or exigent circumstances. There are especially strong expectations of privacy in a private residence and respondents here retained significant privacy interests in their fire-damaged home. Because the warrantless search of the basement and upper areas of respondents’ home was authorized neither by consent nor exigent circumstances, the evidence seized in that search was obtained in violation of respondents’ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and must be suppressed. Pp. 646 – 650.
*288 (a) Where a warrant is necessary to search fire-damaged premises, an administrative warrant suffices if the primary object of the search is to determine the cause and origin of the fire, but a criminal search warrant, obtained upon a showing of probable cause, is required if the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of criminal activity. Pp. 646 – 647.
(b) The search here was not a continuation of an earlier search, and the privacy interests in the residence made the delay between the fire and the midday search unreasonable absent a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486, distinguished. Because the cause of the fire was known upon search of the basement, the search of the upper portions of the house could only have been a search to gather evidence of arson requiring a criminal warrant absent exigent circumstances. Even if the basement search had been a valid administrative search, it would not have justified the upstairs search, since as soon as it had been determined that the fire originated in the basement, the scope of the search was limited to the basement area. Pp. 648 – 650.
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During the investigation of two traffic incidents involving an orange and black motorcycle with an extended frame, Officer David Rhodes learned that the motorcycle likely was stolen and in the possession of petitioner Ryan Collins. Officer Rhodes discovered photographs on Collins’ Facebook profile of an orange and black motorcycle parked in the driveway of a house, drove to the house, and parked on the street. From there, he could see what appeared to be the motorcycle under a white tarp parked in the same location as the motorcycle in the photograph. Without a search warrant, Office Rhodes walked to the top of the driveway, removed the tarp, confirmed that the motorcycle was stolen by running the license plate and vehicle identification numbers, took a photograph of the uncovered motorcycle, replaced the tarp, and returned to his car to wait for Collins. When Collins returned, Officer Rhodes arrested him. The trial court denied Collins’ motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that Officer Rhodes violated the Fourth Amendment when he trespassed on the house’s curtilage to conduct a search, and Collins was convicted of receiving stolen property. The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed. The State Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the warrantless search was justified under the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception.
Like the automobile exception, the Fourth Amendment’s protection of curtilage has long been black letter law. “[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). “At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)). To give full practical effect to that right, the Court considers curtilage—“the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home’ ”—to be “ ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S., at 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984)). “The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to *593 the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986).
The scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself.
It does not give an officer the right to enter a home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant.
The Court has similarly declined to expand the scope of other exceptions to the warrant requirement and that logic applies equally well here.
Under the Plain View Doctrine, an officer must have lawful right of access to any contraband he discovers in plain view in order to seize it without a warrant.
Likewise, although warrantless arrests in public places are valid, an officer generally may not enter a home to make an arrest without a warrant.
So too an officer must have a lawful right of access to a vehicle in order to search it pursuant to the automobile exception.
The automobile exception itself does not afford that necessary right of access because the rationales underlying it take account only of the balance between the intrusion of an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests in his vehicle and the government’s interest in an expedient search of that vehicle.
They do not account for the distinct privacy interests in one’s home or curtilage.
The Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception does not permit a police officer without a warrant to enter private property to search a vehicle parked a few feet from the house.
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Before Officer Nichols could pull over petitioner, petitioner parked and got out of his car. Nichols then parked, accosted petitioner, and arrested him after finding drugs in his pocket. Incident to the arrest, Nichols searched petitioner’s car and found a handgun under the driver’s seat. Petitioner was charged with federal drug and firearms violations. In denying his motion to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an unconstitutional search, the District Court found, inter alia, the automobile search valid under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, in which this Court held that, when a police officer makes a lawful custodial arrest of an automobile’s occupant, the Fourth Amendment allows the officer to search the vehicle’s passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of arrest, id., at 460. Petitioner appealed his conviction, arguing that Belton was limited to situations where the officer initiated contact with an arrestee while he was still in the car. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Belton governs even when an officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle. In Belton, the Court placed no reliance on the fact that the officer ordered the occupants out of the vehicle, or initiated contact with them while they remained within it. And here, there is simply no basis to conclude that the span of the area generally within the arrestee’s immediate control is determined by whether the arrestee exited the vehicle at the officer’s direction, or whether the officer initiated contact with him while he was in the car. In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and evidence destruction as one who is inside. Under petitioner’s proposed “contact initiation” rule, officers who decide that it may be safer and more effective to conceal their presence until a suspect has left his car would be unable to search the passenger compartment in the event of a custodial arrest, potentially compromising their safety and placing incriminating evidence at risk of concealment or destruction. The Fourth Amendment does not require such a gamble. Belton allows police to search a car’s passenger compartment incident to a lawful arrest of both “occupants” and “recent occupants.” Ibid. While an arrestee’s status as a “recent occupant” may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of the arrest and search, it certainly does not turn on whether he was inside or outside the car when the officer first initiated contact with him. Although not all contraband in the passenger compartment is likely to be accessible to a “recent occupant,” the need for a clear rule, readily understood by police and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or were not within an arrestee’s reach at any particular moment, justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated. Under petitioner’s rule, an officer would have to determine whether he actually confronted or signaled confrontation with the suspect while he was in his car, or whether the suspect exited the car unaware of, and for reasons unrelated to, the officer’s presence. Such a rule would be inherently subjective and highly fact specific, and would require precisely the sort of ad hoc determinations on the part of officers in the field and reviewing courts that Belton sought to avoid. Pp. 4–8.
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Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause/Vehicular Tows
The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the City of Portland in an action brought by Andrew Grimm alleging that the City’s procedures for notifying him that his car would be towed were deficient under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Grimm parked a car on the side of a downtown street, paid for an hour and 19 minutes of parking through a mobile app, and then left the car on the street for seven days. During that time, City parking enforcement officers issued multiple parking citations, which they placed on the car’s windshield. After the car sat on the street for five days, a parking enforcement officer added a red slip warning that the car would be towed.
Grimm did not move the car, and, two days after the warning slip was placed on the windshield, the car was towed.
The panel held that the City conformed with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment by providing notice reasonably calculated to alert Grimm of the impending tow. The warning slip placed on the car’s windshield five days after Grimm had parked the car and two days before the car was towed, which explicitly stated that the car would be towed if it were not moved, was reasonably calculated to inform Grimm of the impending tow.
The panel further held that Grimm’s failure to remove the citations and warning slip from the windshield did not provide the City with actual knowledge that its attempt to provide notice had failed.
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1. NOT a crime for citizen to refuse entry to her home to police who do not have an appropriate warrant
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Ultimately, the Court is presented with two facts: (1) Mr. Russell consumed marijuana at least two hours before the stop; and (2) Mr. Russell may have had bloodshot, watery eyes and/or droopy eyelids. These facts put this matter on all fours with Patzer, where the driver was observed only to have “bloodshot and glassy eyes” and admitted to smoking marijuana. 277 F.3d at 1082. Under the Idaho law at issue in that case, the government was required to show that the defendant was under the influence “to a degree which impairs the driver’s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.” Id. at 1084 (quoting Idaho Code § 18-8004(5)). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s “driving and comportment did not evidence any impairment.” Id. Here, too, the Court concludes that Mr. Russell’s driving and comportment do not evidence any impairment such that his ability to drive was “lessened to an appreciable degree.” WPIC 92.10. Notably, the Government has never addressed the relevance of Patzer, either in its briefing or in oral argument at the evidentiary hearing. While the officers were justified in investigating the possibility of marijuana DUI, they should have investigated further (e.g., conducted sobriety tests) or released Mr. Russell instead of arresting him when they did. Therefore, the arrest was unlawful, and all evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed.
Finally, because the Court finds that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Russell and suppresses evidence on this basis, it need not reach Mr. Russell’s additional arguments regarding the search warrants and his request for a Franks hearing.
There is, of course, an elephant in the room (or vehicle): a gun-stolen, loaded with ammunition, and apparently fully functional (see Dkt. No. 45 at 9)-was recovered as a result of the traffic stop. And today’s ruling excludes from trial this crucial evidence against Mr. Russell. But “while it is true that applying the exclusionary rule in this case will mean that a guilty defendant goes free, that is true of applying the exclusionary rule in essentially every case,” and “[n]othing about this case calls for a remedy other than ‘[t]he typical remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation,’ which ‘is the exclusion of evidence discovered as a result of that violation from criminal proceedings against the defendant.’” United States v. Ngumezi, 980 F.3d 1285, 1291 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 974 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2020)). To bless the search and arrest in this matter would be to license the search and arrest of virtually any driver in Seattle or Washington State who has merely consumed marijuana-a lawful act under local and state law-and driven a vehicle, regardless of the drug’s actual effects on their ability to drive.
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