4th Amendment

Officers stopped defendant and appellant Vernon Evans after they observed him commit traffic violations. When Evans refused to comply with a command to exit his automobile, officers broke the vehicle’s window, “Tased” and pepper sprayed him, forcibly removed him from the car, and arrested him for interfering with a police investigation. A warrantless search of the vehicle at the scene revealed 11 empty sandwich baggies and $65 in cash, but no contraband.

A second warrantless search of the car at an impound yard revealed cocaine hidden in an air vent. After the trial court denied Evans’s motion to suppress the baggies, cash, and cocaine, Evans pleaded no contest to violating Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a).

Because the searches of his vehicle were not authorized under either the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement (Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2d 485, 129 S.Ct. 1710] (Gant)) or the automobile exception, they violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse.

Search Incident to Arrest: two-part rule under which an automobile search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest is constitutional (1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle during the search, or (2) if the police have reason to believe that the vehicle contains `evidence relevant to the crime of arrest.’ [Citation.]” (Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2425]; see Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 343 [129 S.Ct. at p. 1719].)

Automobile Exception: Under the automobile exception, police who have probable cause to believe a lawfully stopped vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity or contraband may conduct a warrantless search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found. (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at pp. 346-347 [129 S.Ct. at p. 1721]; Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at pp. 820-821; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 469 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790]; People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh), supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 100-102.) Such a search “is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been obtained.” (Ross, supra, at p. 809.) Ross “allows searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest, and the scope of the search authorized is broader.” (Gant, supra, at p. 347 [129 S.Ct. at p. 1721].) “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” (Ross, supra, at p. 825; see Gant, supra, at p. 347 [129 S.Ct. at p. 1721]; People v. Hunter (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 371, 379-382 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 818].) The automobile exception is rooted in the reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle, the fact a vehicle is inherently mobile, and the historical distinctions between searches of automobiles and dwellings. (See California v. Carney (1985) 471 U.S. 386, 391-393 [85 L.Ed.2d 406, 105 S.Ct. 2066]; People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh), supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 100.)

Full case here: People v. Evans, 200 Cal. App. 4th 735 (2011), https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2893559405216631823&q=People+v.+evans+200+cal.app.4th+735&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&as_vis=1

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The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A “search” involves governmental infringement on “an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable,” while a “seizure” of property involves “some meaningful interference [by the government] with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that “may not be vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). To establish standing to challenge governmental intrusions under the Fourth Amendment, an individual must demonstrate their reasonable expectation of privacy in a place searched, or meaningful interference with their possessory interest in property seized. See United States v. Singleton, 987 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980)); Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1027–29 (9th Cir. 2012).1 “Because warrantless searches or seizures of abandoned property do not violate the [F]fourth [A]mendment, persons who voluntarily abandon property lack standing to complain of its search or seizure.” *1117 United States v. Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986).

We begin with the bedrock principle that warrantless searches and seizures “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (quoting Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19–20, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984)). One of these exceptions is the Terry stop, which permits an officer with reasonable suspicion that an individual is engaged in a crime to briefly detain the individual and make “ ‘reasonable inquiries’ aimed at confirming or dispelling [the officer’s] suspicions.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). If the officer has reasonable suspicion that the detained individual is “armed and presently dangerous,” the officer may conduct a frisk, a protective patdown search of the individual for weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

Full case here: United States v. Baker, 58 F.4th 1109 (2023), https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/01/30/20-50314.pdf

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“An individual asserting Fourth Amendment rights must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable.” United States v. Russell , 847 F.3d 616, 618 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “The defendant moving to suppress bears the burden of proving he had a legitimate expectation of privacy that was violated by the challenged search.” Id. (citation omitted).

The main issue in this appeal is whether Sierra made an initial showing of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Ford. He would have a privacy interest if he owned it, since “[o]ne who owns and possesses a car, like one who owns and possesses a house, almost always has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.” Byrd v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527, 200 L.Ed.2d 805 (2018).

But Sierra didn’t prove he owned the Ford. He had no title, no bill of sale, and no registration. The only evidence he provided, proof of a tire change supposedly done as part of a trade for the Ford, was dated February 19. The search of the Ford took place on February 17. So even if the tire change was enough to prove that Sierra owned the Ford, that wouldn’t prove he owned it at the time of the search.

In a similar situation, the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant did not have standing to challenge a search of a car entrusted to a car hauler. United States v. Castellanos , 716 F.3d 828 (4th Cir. 2013). Despite the defendant claiming that he owned the car, he had no title, no bill of sale, no DMV registration, and no other indication that he was the owner. Id. at 834. His claim that he owned the car was “not substantiated in any way by the record.” Id. And even if he did eventually own the car, there was no evidence that “he did so prior to the search.” Id. The same goes for Sierra.

Even if he wasn’t the owner, Sierra might have shown a reasonable privacy interest in the Ford if he proved he was its sender or intended recipient. See United States v. Jacobsen , 683 F.2d 296, 298 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting “[t]he sender and intended recipient of a package clearly have ‘an adequate possessory or proprietary interest in the … object searched’ to give them standing to question the propriety of its search or seizure”), rev’d on other grounds , 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (citation omitted). But Sierra didn’t prove that either. The name on the bill of lading was Ana Garcia. Sierra never claimed that Ana Garcia was his pseudonym. See Castellanos , 716 F.3d at 834 (finding no standing because “Castellanos adduced no evidence at the suppression hearing demonstrating that the name ‘Wilmer Castenada’ was simply an alias”). In fact, according to the Presentence Investigation Report, officers later found out that Ana Garcia was Alatorre’s alias, not Sierra’s. Regardless, Sierra introduced no reliable evidence showing that he shipped the Ford or was the intended recipient.

Sierra suggests that because he picked up the Ford in Minneapolis, he must be its intended recipient. But that’s not enough. Sure, Sierra was clearly an intended recipient of the drugs in the Ford, but people don’t have a privacy interest in contraband. See Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (“[A]ny interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate ….”) (citation omitted).

As for the truck, simply receiving a package doesn’t make someone its intended recipient. See 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (criminalizing opening a letter addressed to someone else). Someone who steals a package off a front porch doesn’t transform into its intended recipient. Plus, Sierra wasn’t alone in picking up the Ford—Alatorre was there too. All told, Sierra just doesn’t provide enough evidence that he was the intended recipient of the Ford.

Full case here: United States v. Sierra-Serrano, 11 F.4th 931, 933-34 (8th Cir. 2021), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-sierra-serrano-1

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In April 2021 the Springfield, Illinois police saw a Snapchat post of Jeremy Banks barbequing on his front porch with a gun sitting on the grill’s side shelf. Because Banks was a convicted felon, the officers needed nothing more to request a warrant to arrest him for unlawful gun possession. But they skipped this step and instead proceeded to Banks’s home, walked onto his porch, and, after a tussle, arrested him in his family room. The Fourth Amendment did not permit the shortcut, as the Supreme Court has held in no uncertain terms that a front porch—part of a home’s so-called curtilage—receives the same protection as the home itself. And no exception to the warrant requirement saves the officers’ actions here.

By its terms, the Fourth Amendment protected Jeremy Banks’s right “to be secure” in his “hous[e]” from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. At the “very core” of that protection, the Supreme Court has emphasized, stands “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961). Indeed, when measuring the strength of the Fourth Amendment, “the home is first among equals.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). This principle finds deep roots in the common law backdrop against which the Fourth Amendment entered the U.S. Constitution in 1791. See, e.g., Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91 b (KB) (“[T]he house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defen[s]e against injury and violence, as for his repose.”).

By 1984 the Supreme Court made plain that the Fourth Amendment provides equal protection to a home’s curtilage, the area immediately surrounding the home itself. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). “[P]rivacy expectations are most heightened” in the curtilage, because that area is “intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986). And the right to retreat into the home “would be of little practical value if the State’s agents could stand in a home’s porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409. Put even more directly, the curtilage is “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Id. (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735).

United States v. Banks, No. 22-1312, 2023 WL 1956605, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 2023)

Full case here: United States v. Banks, No. 22-1312 (7th Cir. 2023), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1312/22-1312-2023-02-13.html

See: Can police have their K9 sniff at your front door without a warrant? Florida v. Jardines., https://youtu.be/7jb5-4tblj0

See: Can police come to your house, lift the motorcycle cover, and run the plates? | Collins v. Virginia, https://youtu.be/ZQ-BckaR4IQ

See: Police can’t snoop around your front yard & peer into your windows for 15 minutes without a warrant., https://youtu.be/W31wDbQzchg

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
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Background: Lessee of motorized electric scooters brought action challenging constitutionality of city program requiring companies that leased such scooters to obtain permits from the city department of transportation, which, among other conditions, mandated that companies provide real-time location data directly to city for all leased scooters. The United States District Court for the Central District of California, Dolly M. Gee, J., 2021 WL 1220690, dismissed the action. Lessee appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Hawkins, Senior Circuit Judge, held that:
1 city’s collection of real-time location data on scooters amounted to injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing;
2 lessee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time location data; and
3 city’s collection of data did not amount to a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.

Full case here: Sanchez v. Los Angeles Dep’t of Transportation, 39 F.4th 548 (9th Cir. 2022), https://casetext.com/case/sanchez-v-l-a-dept-of-transp

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The initial issue for decision is whether LADOT’s collection of MDS location data is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.5 Only if collection of the data is a search do we need to address the separate question of whether that search is unreasonable. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991).

For much of our Nation’s history, the definition of a search under the Fourth Amendment was “tied to common-law trespass,” focusing on whether government actors had obtained “information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405, 406 n.3, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). In Olmstead v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court found that wiretaps attached to telephone wires on public streets did not constitute a search because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.” 277 U.S. 438, 464, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928).

The Court significantly expanded the doctrinal scope of the analysis in Katz v. United States, finding that the attachment of an eavesdropping device to a public *555 telephone booth was a search, memorably stating that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Its subsequent decisions have framed the inquiry as whether the challenged government action violates a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” citing Justice Harlan’s seminal Katz concurrence. Id. at 360, 88 S.Ct. 507. Thus, when an individual “seeks to preserve something as private,” and that expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,” government intrusion into that private sphere generally qualifies as a search requiring a warrant supported by probable cause. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (cleaned up).

…

The third-party doctrine teaches that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44, 99 S.Ct. 2577; see also United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that the “third-party doctrine” instructs “that a person’s *557 privacy interest is diminished where he or she reveals information to a third party, even in confidence”). This is true “even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose.” United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976). “As a result, the Government is typically free to obtain such information from the recipient without triggering Fourth Amendment protections.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216. Sanchez v. Los Angeles Dep’t of Transportation, 39 F.4th 548, 556–57 (9th Cir. 2022)

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A search typically requires a warrant based on probable cause. SeeUnited States v. Dalton , 918 F.3d 1117, 1127 (10th Cir. 2019). “Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few ‘specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson , 328 F.3d 1230, 1248 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ). Although “the defendant bears the burden of proving whether and when the Fourth Amendment was implicated,” Hernandez , 847 F.3d at 1263 (quotations omitted), “[t]he government then bears the burden of proving that its warrantless actions were justified [by an exception],” United States v. Carhee , 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1994). If the government establishes that an exception to the warrant requirement applies, the search is constitutional. SeeUnited States v. Maestas , 2 F.3d 1485, 1491-92 (10th Cir. 1993). The Government relies on the community-caretaking exception here.

The community-caretaking exception allows the government to introduce evidence obtained through searches that are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Cady v. Dombrowski , 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). “Noninvestigatory searches of automobiles pursuant to this function … do not offend Fourth Amendment principles so long as such activities are warranted in terms of state law or sound police procedure, and are justified by concern for the safety of the general public ….” United States v. Lugo , 978 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted).

The government must also point to “specific and articulable facts which reasonably warrant an intrusion into the individual’s liberty,” and must show that “the government’s interest … outweigh[s] the individual’s interest in being free from arbitrary governmental interference.” United States v. Garner , 416 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted and alterations incorporated). Although officers are entitled to “some latitude in undertaking their community caretaking role,” their actions must be “reasonably related in scope” to the underlying justification. Lundstrom v. Romero , 616 F.3d 1108, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010) ; see alsoGarner , 416 F.3d at 1213 (explaining that the “scope [of a community-caretaking detention] must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification”).

…

The Government has not shown that “state law or sound police procedure” warranted opening the camper. Lugo , 978 F.2d at 635 (quotations omitted). Nor has it demonstrated how opening the camper was “justified by concern for the safety of the general public.” Id. (quotations omitted). Ms. Parrish could have opened the camper herself, and the Government fails to explain how her doing so might have created any danger. It identifies “no specific and articulable facts” demonstrating Deputy Clinton needed to stand behind the tailgate, lift the camper’s hatch, or look into the bed of the truck. Storey , 696 F.3d at 996 (quotations omitted). Nor was opening the camper “necessary to protect” Ms. Parrish, Mr. Neugin, the officers, or others. Id. (quotations omitted).

The Government points out that Deputy Clinton needed to “separate a feuding couple.” Aplee. Br. at 12. But this does not explain why he needed to open the camper or look inside.

Deputy Clinton unconstitutionally searched the truck when he opened the camper and looked in. He exceeded any community-caretaking role.

Full case here: United States v. Neugin, 958 F.3d 924, 930 (10th Cir. 2020), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-neugin

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
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Based in San Diego, CA
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The San Diego-based business litigation and criminal defense attorneys at LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM are experienced and dedicated professionals singularly focused on one goal: achieving the best results for our clients. Through our hard work and expertise, we guarantee all of our clients that we will diligently protect their rights and zealously pursue justice. Our clients deserve nothing less!

This is a response video to a comment left by JO BR on “Can FBI record citizens in a hotel room with a secret hidden camera without a warrant? Nerber (2000)” video found at https://youtu.be/txO6CPt7JKk [Published on 12/14/2022]

The Fourth Amendment protects you against government intrusions and does not restrict private citizens. Under the private search doctrine, when a private actor finds evidence of criminal conduct after searching someone without a warrant, the government can use the evidence in criminal proceedings. (United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)). As long as the private actor is not acting at an officer’s invitation or direction. When a private party informs the police about the incriminating evidence, an officer may conduct a search strictly limited to the scope of the private party’s search.

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
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Based in San Diego, CA
Licensed: California, Nevada, and Federal Courts

The San Diego-based business litigation and criminal defense attorneys at LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM are experienced and dedicated professionals singularly focused on one goal: achieving the best results for our clients. Through our hard work and expertise, we guarantee all of our clients that we will diligently protect their rights and zealously pursue justice. Our clients deserve nothing less!

Evidence derived from video surveillance of a hotel room was suppressed by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Thomas S. Zilly, J., and the United States appealed. The Court of Appeals, James R. Browning, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from secret video surveillance in another person’s hotel room without a warrant or the consent of a participant in the monitored activity, and (2) thus, though defendants were invited to a hotel room, rented by government agents, by informants who had consented to video surveillance, once the informants left the room, defendants had reasonable expectation to be free from hidden video surveillance.

Full case here: UNITED STATES v. NERBER, 222 F.3d 597 (2000), https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9997732378699863410&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
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Do you want to buy our Lawstache merchandise? Maybe a t-shirt?
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Based in San Diego, CA
Licensed: California, Nevada, and Federal Courts

The San Diego-based business litigation and criminal defense attorneys at LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM are experienced and dedicated professionals singularly focused on one goal: achieving the best results for our clients. Through our hard work and expertise, we guarantee all of our clients that we will diligently protect their rights and zealously pursue justice. Our clients deserve nothing less!